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  • 學位論文

迎合、議價與競爭:從新能源汽車產業看中國大陸的碎片化威權主義

Complying, Bargaining, and Competing:The Fragmented Authoritarianism in Mainland China’s New Energy Vehicle Industry

指導教授 : 張登及

摘要


中國大陸的政策是如何被制定出來的?中國大陸的各級政府在政策制定的過程當中分別扮演了什麼角色,發揮了什麼作用?哪些因素可以影響中國大陸各級政府的政策決策?長期以來,這些問題一直都是中國大陸政治研究的核心和焦點。改革開放以來,中國大陸的政治和經濟環境出現了很多前所未有的變化,在經濟類政策議題上中央政府很難再獨攬大權,常常需要就某些議題與各地方政府進行協商,地方政府的政策自主性也逐漸擴大,開始有了與中央政府在政策議題上議價乃至對抗的權力,學界通常用「碎片化的威權」解釋這一現象。新能源汽車作為近年來中國大陸熱門的經濟類議題,其在中國大陸各省市的產生、發展與成熟都與各級政府的政策息息相關,是一個觀察碎片化威權主義在當今中國運作的良好案例。 本文從「碎片化的威權主義」理論出發,通過對2001年到2020年中國大陸新能源汽車的發展情況,中央政府的政策演變,以及北京市、上海市、吉林省、浙江省等地方省級(直轄市)政府在該政策議題領域內與中央政府的議價、迎合與競爭行為的研究分析,探究中國大陸各級政府在新能源汽車這一政策領域內的決策流程與決策模式。本文發現,在新能源汽車領域之內中央政府並沒有獨攬決策的大權,地方政府可以就相關議題與中央政府進行議價與對抗,即便是在普遍認為中央政府權力得到擴張的十八大乃至十九大之後,地方政府仍然具有相當強的政策自主性。為了順利推進政策落地,中央政府往往會獎勵迎合而懲罰對抗或是陽奉陰違的地方政府,地方政府之間也會彼此競爭也獲得中央的厚愛。雖然地方政府具有很強的自主性,但是中央政府在決策過程仍然居於更高的地位,它可以根據自己的需要擴大或是降低地方政府的自主性,也可以通過懲罰措施使得地方政府受到意想不到的巨大懲罰。與「碎片化的威權主義」常常用來解釋中國大陸政府的機制失靈不同的是,本文的研究指出在中央政府與地方政府不斷地議價與對抗,以及地方政府之間彼此競爭的過程當中,中國大陸的新能源汽車政策不斷磨合修正並逐漸走向成熟。

並列摘要


Since the reform and opening up, there have been many unprecedented changes in the political and economic environment in mainland China. It is difficult for the central government to monopolize the power on economic policy issues, and it is often necessary to negotiate with local and provincial governments on certain issues. The policy autonomy of local governments has gradually expanded. Local governments have begun to get the power to bargain and even confront the central government on policy issues. The scholars of china studies usually use "fragmented authoritarianism" to explain this phenomenon. New energy vehicles have been a hot economic issue in mainland China in recent years. The emergence, development and maturity of this industry in various provinces in mainland China are closely related to the policies of governments at all levels. It is a good case to observe the operation of fragmented authoritarianism in China today. Based by the theory of "fragmented authoritarianism", this article analyzes the development of new energy vehicles in mainland China from 2001 to 2020, and the policy evolution of the central and local governments including Beijing, Shanghai, Jilin Province, Zhejiang Province and others. This article finds that in the field of new energy vehicles, the central government does not have the power to make decisions by itself. Local governments can negotiate and confront the central government on related issues, even after the 18th and 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which is generally believed the power of the central government had expanded. Local governments still have considerable policy autonomy. In order to promote the implementation of policies, the central government will often reward local governments that cater to but punish the confrontation or violations. Therefore, local governments will also compete with each other and gain the central government’s reward. Although local governments have strong autonomy, the central government still holds a higher position in the policy-making process. It can expand or reduce the autonomy of local governments according to its own needs, and it can also make local governments suffer unexpectedly punishment. In the process of constant bargaining and complying between the central government and local governments, as well as competition between local governments, the new energy vehicle policy in mainland China has been adjusted and revised, and gradually matures.

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