本研究欲探討分紅本身可能為一有效之激勵措施。但若公司治理不佳,管理者基於自利因素而過度分紅,則分紅對績效將產生負向影響。本研究之貢獻在於區分分紅較少及分紅過多兩組別,分別檢視分紅對績效是否有不同的影響。且觀察兩組別的公司治理機制是否有所差異。本研究所獲之實證結果與結論如下: 1.現金權及外資持股比對分紅決策具顯著影響力。檢定結果顯示分紅較少的組別公司治理較佳,公司治理較差的公司傾向發放過多分紅。 2.以下年度資產報酬率為績效變數時,在分紅過多的組別,分紅對績效產生顯著之負向稀釋效果。主要由股票分紅所致。在分紅較少的組別稀釋效果不顯著,且現金分紅具顯著的正向激勵效果。推測導因於過度分紅組別在下年度亦有持續過度分紅之現象且若基於自利因素過度分紅,分紅將無助於公司績效表現。 3.以下年度的股票異常報酬為績效變數時,在分紅過多組別,分紅產生顯著正向異常報酬,主要由股票分紅所致。推測因投資人對公司發放太多分紅的壞消息過度反應,或認為過度分紅是股價被高估之信號,過度修正,給予太低之股價評價。導致該公司下年度產生正異常報酬。 4.在以較嚴的分紅標準(公司治理變數代樣本最佳值)區分分組時,股票分紅在分紅較少組才會產生正向激勵效果。 本研究建議管理者欲以分紅激勵員工時,應考量公司實際狀況,如未來成長機會、公司財務狀況等,做出適當的分紅決策。不應過度分紅導致股東的財富無形中移轉予管理者及員工。
The thesis investigates the employee bonus programs can be an effective incentive compensation scheme. But if the managers want to benefit themselves and expropriate other stakeholders from issuing too much bonus, the incentive scheme will not improve future firm performance. This study divides firms into two groups (issue too much bonus and issue less bonus) and examines the relation between employee bonus and subsequent firm performance respectively. I also test whether there are differences in corporate governance between the two groups. The empirical results indicate that the controlling shareholder’s cash flow right and professional investors does influence the adoption of employee bonus schemes. The firm which is in bad corporate governance tends to issue too much bonus and the incentive scheme can not create better subsequent firm performance. When the firm issues too much bonus, investors may overreact and the low stock price result into a positive abnormal return in the following year. In the group which firms do not issue too much bonus, the dilution effect is not significant and cash bonus have a significant positive inventive effect. The result suggests that in order to improve firm performance, managers should consider the circumstance the firm face and should not distribute excess bonus.