高管激勵對R&D投入與企業價值關係的影響

The effect of executive incentives on the relationship between R&D investment and enterprise value

張怡(Yi Zhang)

指導教授 ： 葉疏

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2020年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202000909

摘要

本文選取2014-2017 間中國深滬兩市A股上市公司披露 R&D 投入強度與高管激勵數據的1228 家企業作為研究樣本，實證檢驗 R&D 投入強度與企業價值(TOBINQ)的關係，並進一步分析高管激勵是否對R&D投入強度與企業價值有調節效應。並在此研究基礎上，根據企業所有權性質不同及所屬行業分類不同，將樣本分為國營企業及私營企業、歸屬於高科技行業企業及歸屬於非高科技行業企業兩組樣本，分別對兩組樣本的高管激勵的調節效應進行研究分析。研究企業在不同的所有權性質及行業分類下，高管激勵對 R&D 投入強度與企業價值的調節效應是否有所差異。
本文研究結果表明：
（1）R&D 投入強度與當期企業價值為正相關關係。
（2）R&D 投入強度對企業價值的影響存在正向的滯後效應，該滯後效應至少存在兩期，且在滯後一期達到最佳，隨後開始減弱。
（3）高管薪酬激勵和股權激勵對 R&D 投入強度與當期企業價值的關係均具有正向的調節作用，企業可以通過建立適當的高管激勵機制來強化 R&D 投入強度與當期企業價值的正相關關係。
（4）從高管激勵的調節效益來看，高管薪酬激勵和股權激勵皆為半調節變量；根據企業所有權性質不同，高管激勵的調節效應也存在差異。在私營企業中，高管薪酬激勵與股權激勵皆為半調節變量，即高管薪酬激勵和股權激勵既直接作用於企業價值，也能夠強化R&D 投入強度與企業價值的正相關關係。在國營企業中，高管薪酬激勵及股權激勵均對R&D 投入強度與企業價值的關係不具調節效應。
在歸屬於高科技行業的企業中，高管薪酬激勵及股權激勵-持股對R&D 投入強度與企業價值關係的調節效應並不顯著，高管股權激勵-激勵計劃為半調節變量。在歸屬於非高科技行業的企業中，高管薪酬激勵和股權激勵皆為半調節變量。
最後，根據本文的實證結果，從高管激勵的角度提出如何促使企業加大研發投入，提高企業價值的建議，並指出本文的不足及展望。

關鍵字

R&D 投入 ； 企業價值 ； 高管激勵 ； 調節效應

並列摘要

With 1,228 companies that disclose R&D input intensity and executive incentive data from listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai between 2014 and 2017 as the research sample, this paper aims at empirically testing the relationship between R&D input intensity and enterprise value (TOBINQ), and it further analyzes whether executive incentives have the regulatory effect on R&D investment intensity and enterprise value. On the basis of the above research, according to the different nature of the ownership of the enterprise and the different classification of the industry, this paper divides the sample into two groups as state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, enterprises belonging to high-tech industries and enterprises belonging to non-high-tech industries, and studies and analyzes the regulation effect of the sample's executive incentives respectively. It aims at studying whether there are differences in the regulatory effect of R&D input intensity and enterprise value by executive incentive under the different ownership nature and industry classification.
The results of this paper show that: (1) R&D input intensity is positively correlated with current enterprise value. (2) There is a positive lag effect on the impact of R&D input intensity on enterprise value. The lag effect has at least two phases, and it reaches the best in the first phase of lag, and then begins to weaken. (3) Executive compensation incentives and equity incentives have a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between R&D investment intensity and current enterprise value. Enterprises can strengthen the positive correlation between R&D investment intensity and current enterprise value by establishing appropriate executive incentive mechanisms. (4) From the perspective of the adjustment benefits of executive incentives, executive compensation incentives and equity incentives are semi-regulated variables; according to the different nature of enterprise ownership, there are also differences in the regulatory effects of executive incentives. In the private enterprises, executive compensation incentives and equity incentives are semi-regulated variables, that is, executive compensation incentives and equity incentives directly affect the enterprise value, and it can also strengthen the positive correlation between R&D investment intensity and enterprise value. In the state-owned enterprises, executive compensation incentives and equity incentives have no regulatory effect on the relationship between R&D input intensity and enterprise value. In the enterprises belonging to the high-tech industry, the adjustment effect of executive compensation incentives and equity incentive-shareholding on the relationship between R&D investment intensity and enterprise value are not significant. The equity incentive-incentive plan is a semi-regulated variable. While in the enterprises belonging to non-high-tech industries, the executive compensation incentives and equity incentives are both semi-regulated variables.
Finally, according to the empirical results of this paper, from the perspective of executive incentives, this paper puts forward suggestions on how to encourage enterprises to increase R&D investment and improve enterprise value, and the shortcomings and prospects of this paper are also presented.

並列關鍵字

R&D input ； enterprise value ； executive incentives ； regulatory effects

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