股權結構及董事會特性對企業績效與股利政策之影響

The Impact of Ownership Structure and Board Characteristics on Firm Performance and Dividend Policy

莊晏婷(Yen-Ting Chuang)

指導教授 ： 顧廣平

淡江大學/商管學院/財務金融學系碩士班/碩士(2020年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2020.00179

摘要

本研究探究企業內部股權持有者及董事會特性等公司治理指標對公司經營績效及股利發放之影響，被解釋變數包括會計基礎績效指標ROA、ROE，市場基礎績效指標Tobin's Q，及股利支付率、股利殖利率、現金股利率等三項股利政策指標，解釋變數則包含多項股權結構及董事會特性變數。
結果顯示大股東持股與會計績效無顯著相關性，但與Tobin’s Q存在顯著負相關，顯示大股東持股無益於提升公司績效。在全部樣本及非金電樣本中，董事會規模雖對提升會計績效無益，卻對企業市場績效存在溢價效果。董事會獨立性在全部樣本分析中對績效指標存在顯著正向關係。另外，在電子業樣本中，本國投信公司持股與上市(櫃)公司經營績效之間則存在正向關係。
結果也發現股利支付率較少受到股權結構及董事會特性影響。在股利殖利率及現金股利率方面，經理人持股與較高的股利分配水準相關，大股東持股則與股利政策無顯著相關。

關鍵字

股權結構 ； 董事會 ； 公司績效 ； 股利政策 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

This study explores the impact of corporate governance indicators such as ownership structure and board characteristics on the company operating performance and dividend policy. Explained variables include accounting-based performance indicators: ROA and ROE, market-based performance indicators Tobin's Q, and three dividend policy indicators: dividend payout ratio, dividend yield, and cash dividend yield. Explanatory variables include several ownership structure and board characteristics variables.
The results show that there is an insignificantly correlation between the blockholder shareholding and accounting performance, and there is a significantly negative associated with Tobin's Q, indicating that blockholder shareholding cannot improve company performance. In all sample and non-finance non-electronics industry sample, although the size of the board cannot improve accounting performance, it has a premium effect on the market performance. The board independence has a significantly positive associated with the performance indicators in all sample. Also, in electronics industry sample, there is a positive relationship between the shareholding of domestic securities investment trust companies and the operating performance.
The results also show that payout ratio is less affected by ownership structure and board characteristic. Regarding dividend yield and cash dividend yield, the manager shareholding is related to a higher level of dividend distribution, while the blockholder shareholding is an insignificantly related to dividend policy.

並列關鍵字

Ownership Structure ； Board of Directors ； Company Performance ； Dividend Policy ； Corporate Governance

參考文獻

參考文獻

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