公司治理與金融風暴的事件研究-以台灣橡膠產業為例

Corporate Governance and Capability to Secure External Shocks: An Event of Rubber Industry in Taiwan

余家禎(Chia-Jen Yu)

指導教授 ： 賈昭南

淡江大學/商管學院/國際商學碩士在職專班/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2013.00921

摘要

本文首先利用事件研究分析法，檢視2008年第3季美國次級房貸金融風暴事件發生後，台灣地區橡膠產業8家樣本公司的營業收益所受衝擊以及其復原狀況。然後，將樣本公司依四種不同的股權結構加以分類，比較各類別公司因應外來不利衝擊的表現。實證研究結果顯示，具有下列特徵的公司，在因應外來衝擊方面的能力較優：(1) .產品定位屬於供應鏈上游者，(2) 外銷比重越高其者，(3) 佈局大陸地區者。本文研究結果分別為a.董監持股比例較低族群較優b.十大股東持股比例較高者較優c.國內法人持股比例較高者較優d.外資持股比例較高者較優。就群體而言，多數為持股比例較高者在因應外來衝擊時表現較優。但是，持股比例較低者的普遍穩定性則優於前者。

關鍵字

事件研究

並列摘要

This thesis first applies the event study analysis method to examine the impacts and the restorations of the operating incomes of the eight firms of the robber industry in Taiwan after the impact of the 2008 U.S. subprime financial crisis. Then the firms are categorized into two groups based on four different shareholder structures to compare the capabilities of coping with the adverse external impact. The empirical event studies have shown that firms characterized with the followings were performing better during the period of crisis: (1) those with the product line listed in the upper stream of the supply chain, (2) those with higher proportions of business in foreign market, and (3) those operated also in China. Group studies have shown that firms with higher proportions of share held by the board members, by the ten largest shareholders, by domestic institute investors and by foreign institute investors performed better. However, the firms with lower proportions of shares held by the same four categories are more stable in terms of their operating incomes.

並列關鍵字

Event Study

參考文獻

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