菲律賓南海政策之轉變：從艾奎諾三世到杜特蒂政府

The Evolution of the South Sea Policy of the Philippines: From the Benigno S. Aquino, III to the Duterte Administrations

王聖閔(Sheng-Min Wang)

指導教授 ： 黃介正

淡江大學/國際研究學院/國際事務與戰略研究所碩士班/碩士(2020年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2020.00718

摘要

南海諸島及所屬海域主權爭端長期係東亞區域之潛在衝突點，該海域係連接太平洋及印度洋、連通亞洲與大洋洲之重要海上交通樞紐，且含有豐富的天然資源，如石油、天然氣、漁業資源等，兼具豐富自然資源及地緣戰略價值等條件，加上周遭環繞數個國家及島礁，衍生南海複雜之領土及領海紛爭，而1982年「聯合國海洋法公約」賦予沿海國200海浬專屬經濟區之主權權利，激化周邊國家對南海島嶼及其水域主權之競逐。
2014年中共領導人習近平主政後，中共南海政策有日趨強硬態勢，除宣揚中共擁有「九段線」主權之既定立場的聲明外，同時以政治、外交、軍事等實質行動強化主權聲張；與此同時，菲律賓、越南、馬來西亞等聲索國，亦加強對南海佔有島礁之行政治理及軍事整備，導致各方發生軍事衝突之可能性大增。
2016年6月菲律賓總統杜特蒂上任後，顛覆前任總統艾奎諾三世對於南海政策「親美制中」之傳統政治與承襲，轉為「遠美親中」，以圖更多國家現實利益，這是有其理性與地緣政經戰略考量 。同年7月南海仲裁案結果，支持菲律賓在此案相關問題上的幾乎全部訴求。然杜特蒂選擇擱置國際仲裁法庭判決中共對南海大部分領土聲索無效之裁定，並加強與中共就經貿、軍事、油氣等面向合作關係。
2017年4月6日，杜特蒂在視察巴拉望島軍營時表示，已下令菲律賓軍隊在南海主權爭議區域的無人島礁插上菲律賓國旗，並建設掩體、民房、供給設備等，以宣示菲方擁有上述島礁之主權 ；2018年5月菲國外交部長凱耶塔諾透露，杜特蒂已就南海問題對中共劃下紅線，假如中共在黃岩島建築設施，以及若有任何國家開發西菲律賓海，那麼菲律賓就會對這些跨越紅線的國家宣戰 。顯見杜特蒂總統在南海政策上轉趨強硬，除加強島礁軍事部署建設，並表示不排除反制中共侵權行為，與甫上任完全親中之南海政策又有所轉變。
本文採用文獻分析法及比較分析法，從艾奎諾三世政府及杜特蒂政府之內外部環境變化，並比較兩任政府決策模式之差異，藉以分析菲律賓南海政策轉變之因素。

關鍵字

南海主權 ； 南海仲裁案 ； 航行自由

並列摘要

The sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea islands and their maritime areas have long been a potential conflict point in East Asia. This sea area is an important maritime transportation hub that connects the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean and connects Asia and Oceania. It is also rich in natural resources, such as oil, gas, and fishery resources. It is rich in natural resources and geostrategic values, as well as surrounding several countries and islands and reefs, which leads to complicated territorial disputes and territorial waters in the South China Sea. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea gave coastal countries 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone. The sovereignty rights of the neighboring countries intensify the competition for sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their waters by neighboring countries.
After the Communist Party of China ’s leader Xi Jinping took power in 2014, the CPC ’s policy on the South China Sea has become increasingly tough. In addition to a statement proclaiming the Communist Party ’s established position of sovereignty over the “nine-segment line”, it has also strengthened its sovereignty with political, diplomatic, military and other substantive actions; At the same time, the claiming countries, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, have also strengthened their administrative management and military preparations for the islands and reefs occupied by the South China Sea, which has greatly increased the possibility of military conflicts between the parties.
After taking office in June 2016, President Duterte of the Philippines overturned the traditional politics and inheritance of the former President Aquino III ’s policy on the South China Sea, and turned it into a “pro-American pro-China” in order to increase the actual interests of the country. This is because of its rational and geopolitical and economic considerations. In July of the same year, the results of the South China Sea arbitration case supported the Philippines' almost all claims in this case. However, Duterte chose to shelve the International Arbitration Tribunal's ruling that the Communist Party of China claims invalidity in most of the South China Sea territory, and strengthened cooperation with the Communist Party in economic, trade, military, oil and gas, etc.
On April 6, 2017, while inspecting Palawan Barracks, Duterte stated that he had ordered the Philippine army to insert the Philippine flag on uninhabited islands and reefs in the disputed area of the South China Sea, and to build bunkers, houses, and supply equipment to declare The Philippines has sovereignty over the islands and reefs mentioned above. In May 2018, Filipino Minister of Foreign Affairs Kayetano revealed that Duterte had drawn a red line for the CCP on the South China Sea issue. If the CCP builds facilities on Huangyan Island, and if any country develops Western Philippines, then the Philippines will declare war on these countries that cross the red line. It is obvious that President Duterte has become tougher in the South China Sea policy. In addition to strengthening the military deployment of islands and reefs, he also stated that he would not rule out anti-CCP infringements, and changed the South China Sea policy with his predecessor.
This thesis uses the literature analysis method and comparative analysis method to analyze the changes in the policy of the Philippines ’South China Sea from the internal and external environment changes of the Aquino III government and the Duterte government.

並列關鍵字

Sovereignty of the South China Sea ； The South China Sea Arbitration ； Freedom of navigation

參考文獻

一、 官方資料

1. 行政院海岸巡防署，＜陸菲南海仲裁案國際法議題研究＞，頁1。

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