財務受限與公司治理之關係研究-以台灣上市櫃公司為例

本文主要探討公司財務受限與公司治理之間的關係。而本研究對財務受限的定義為公司取得資金的能力，之所以研究此議題的主要原因為全球在經歷了多次金融風暴後許多學者開始意識到了公司治理的重要性，而當中更有學者認為某些公司治理變數與公司的現金持有存在著某種關聯性。本文採用台灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ) 收集了1989到2018台灣所有上市貴公司除金融業的資料，並採用了Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) 所使用的衡量變數然後加入公司治理變數進行驗證。此外本文採用了OLS估計方法來檢驗現金流量敏感度與持有現金變動量之間的關係，而研究結果預期者兩者的關係為正相關。本研究不同於美國學者使用ＷＷ指數作為衡量財務受限的方法，而是採用 Hovakimian (2009)的方法去求出每一間公司的現金流量敏感度後，接著再區分為財務不受限以及財務受限的公司以符合台灣公司的資料。最後本研究將法人持股率列為重要的公司治理變數，因為根據Ginglinger and Saddour (2007)所提出的論點，他們發現財務受限的公司可能因為少數股東的集權因而增加代理成本並持有大量現金。而張麗娟、晁罡與詹芷樺 (2016)也同樣認為法人持股以及獨立董監席次、董監質押比率相較於其他公司治理變數對於公司的經營績效是較有影響力的。而實驗結果因台灣的公司治理樣本並不齊全因此大多的公司治理變數與公司財務受限與否呈現為不顯著，唯獨獨立董監席次這項變數為顯著的負相關。

關鍵字

財務受限；持有現金比率；現金流量敏感度；公司治理

並列摘要

This paper mainly discusses the relationship between corporate financial constraint and corporate governance. Financial constraints mean the ability of firms to obtain funds in this paper. After the financial crisis, many scholars around the world have noticed the importance of corporate governance. Therefore, hypothesis believed that some corporate governance variables might affect the cash holding of firms. This paper utilizes the Taiwan Economic News Database (TEJ) to collect data on all listed companies in Taiwan except for the financial industry from 1989 to 2018, and modified the measurement variables used by Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and then adds corporate governance variables for verification. Besides, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology was adopted to figure out the correlation of the sensitivity of cash flow and the amount of change in cash held, and the result of this experiment evidence that those observations have a positive correlation. Unlike American scholars adopted WW index to measure financial constraints. This paper references the method invented by Hovakimian (2009) which measured the cash flow sensitivity of each firm and then classification it into financial unconstraint and financial constraint firms. Finally, according to Ginglinger and Saddour (2007), financial constraints firms may increase agency costs and hold large amounts of cash due to the centralization of the minority of shareholders. Besides, Zhang Lijuan, Chao Gang, and Zhan Zhihua (2016) also believe that compare to other corporate governance variables corporate shareholding, the number of independent director and pledge ratios have a significant effect on the firms' performance. However, due to the shortage of corporate governance data in Taiwan, the results of this paper indicate that most of the corporate governance variables do not have a significant correlation with financial constraint. Only the number of independent directors has a significant negative correlation.