風險分類不完全下的交叉補貼效果─以性別變數為例

The Cross-Subsidization from Imperfect Risk-Classification─ Imperfectly Risk Classification of Gender

謝淑榕(Shu-Rong Shie)

指導教授 ： 汪琪玲

淡江大學/商學院/保險學系保險經營碩士班/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2010.01403

摘要

本篇摘要未授權

關鍵字

風險分類 ； 逆選擇 ； 交叉補貼 ； 損失幅度

並列摘要

This abstract would not be displayed due to no authorization.

並列關鍵字

Risk Classification ； Adverse Selection ； Cross Subsidization ； Loss Severity

參考文獻

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4.Chiappori, P., & Salanie, B. (2000). Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets. Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 56-78.

5.Cohen, A. (2005). Asymmetric information and learning: Evidence from the automobile insurance market. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(2), 197-207.

6.Dahlby, B. G. (1983). Adverse selection and statistical discrimination. an analysis of canadian automobile insurance. Journal of Public Economics, 20(1), 121-130. Retrieved from SCOPUS database.