日本公共年金改革之研究：官僚主導的政治妥協過程

回顧相關文獻分析，日本的基礎年金於1980年代開始設立，成為亞洲第一個進行公共年金改革的國家，本研究針對日本公共年金制度改革前後的制度內容進行比較，並對厚生勞動省官員代表以及專家學者所進行的深度訪談內容，理解公共年金制度改革後至2020年的具體實施成果以及相關的課題為本文研究目的。本文探討日本年金制度之背景，分為官僚主導年金改革時期（1985-2009）、政治家主導年金改革時期（2009-2012）、官邸政治主導年金改革時期（2012-2020），凸顯日本官僚政治在年金改革扮演的重要角色。本研究發現，日本公共年金制度改革係受到人口結構的轉變、財務負擔惡化影響，進行年金改革，而實施公共年金制度，除了確立國庫的負擔比例以及保費的調整基準外，更明文規定財源的依據。但因保險費率的調高使得保費增加，導致欠費率逐年提高，在厚生年金的部分，產生民眾對所希望領取的金額與政府的年金給付有所落差，及保險費率調整導致民眾對政府信心不足，更可確認日本公共年金制度具有「自助互助」的意義。此外，本文認為日本政府為維持年金制度的平衡，無論是政治家主導或者是官邸主導，都透過專家學者會議，聽取企業勞工團體的意見，使政策更貼近社會看法，惟專家學者會議的進行及資料的提供，仍由官僚所主導，所以形式上雖是以政治家主導或者是官邸主導的模式進行年金改革，實質上仍舊偏向官僚主導。

關鍵字

公共年金；欠費率；年金改革；自助互助；官僚主導

並列摘要

A review of the relevant literature analysis demonstrates that Japan commenced basic pension in 1980, making it the first country to have undergone public pension reform. Thus, a greater need for comparing Japan’s public pension system before and after the reform, gaining an insight into the specific implementation from after the public pension system reform through 2020, as well as related issues based on in-depth interviews with officials, experts, and scholars from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, all of which are the main research objectives. The discussion on the background of Japan’s pension system divided into bureaucrat-led annual reform period (1985-2009), politician-led reform period (2009-2012), and official residence politics-led pension reform period (2012-2020) further highlighted the importance of Japan’s bureaucratic politics on the pension reform. The study findings show that Japan’s public pension system has been subject to changes in the demographic structure and the deterioration of the financial burden, which lead to the pension reform. In the implementation of the public pension reform, in addition to confirming the burden ratio of national treasure and the premium adjustments basis, the financial sources have been explicitly stipulated. However, since increases in insurance premium rates have led to higher insurance premiums, overdue rates have also increased year by year. For the employees’ pension part, the amounts the general public expects to receive are different from the government’s pension payments. One top of it, the insurance premium rate adjustment has resulted in the general public’s lack of confidence towards the government, which further validates the “Self/Mutual Help” significance of Japan’s public pension system. Additionally, it is deemed in this paper that in order for the Japanese government to maintain the balance of the pension system, whether politician-led or official residence-led, scholar and exert meetings should be held to gather the opinions of enterprises and labor groups, so that the policies can be more in line with external viewpoints. However, since the conduction of such meetings and the provision of information are bureaucrat-led, even though pension reform is carried out in a politicians-led or official residence-led form, it is still essentially characterized by bureaucrat-led inclinations.