建構有效能之競爭法損害賠償制度： 比較法與經濟分析的啟示

本研究的目的在於找出我國競爭法損害賠償訴訟的困境並嘗試提出可能的解決方案。首先本研究介紹損害賠償在競爭法中的功能與重要性，並介紹美國、歐盟、我國的現行競爭法損害賠償制度。接著，我國判決的量化描述與實務工作者的訪談分析將呈現我國競爭法損害賠償訴訟所面臨的可能困境；本研究並將討論這些困境的可能解決方式。最後，本研究將討論在競爭法損害賠償訴訟數量開始增加後實務上所可能遇到的問題。本研究的貢獻至少存在於兩方面。其一，本研究在現有損害賠償功能的理論外，闡釋損害賠償如何貢獻於嚇阻，以及損害填補的功能有和效率意義。其二，本研究以質化與量化的方式指出現行實務上希望請求損害賠償的反競爭行為受害者所可能面對的問題。理論方面，筆者主張損害賠償對維持競爭秩序的貢獻在於（1）以更低的成本對行為人施加反競爭行為的最適法律效果；與（2）透過損害填補促進反競爭行為前資源分配的效率，並在反競爭行為後使競爭者的競爭能力趨向反競爭行為前的狀態。實證方面，筆者根據國內案件的量化調查結果與訪談實務工作者的訪談，認為現行制度的主要問題之一在於公平會行政程序開啟不影響損害賠償請求權消滅時效進行。此一制度迫使欲請求損害賠償的反競爭行為被害人縱無證明反競爭行為存在的能力，也必須在欠缺確定處分的情形下提起損害賠償訴訟；而案件調查結果顯示，民事法院在欠缺公平會確定處分的案件中，認定反競爭行為存在的比例明顯偏低。此外，實務上證據揭露制度對請求揭露方特定揭露標的的要求常使原告難以舉證，也是反競爭行為被害人請求賠償時所面臨的重要困境。有趣的是，文獻雖指出選擇退出（opt-out）集體救濟制度的欠缺可能是當事人起訴意願低落的原因之一，但選擇退出集體救濟制度未必值得採行，因為其功能透過公平會執法能夠更以更低成本達成。本文也討論當損害賠償訴訟的數量開始增加，實務上將面臨的進一步問題。這些問題包含公執法（public enforcement）與私執法（private enforcement）的配合方式、轉嫁抗辯（與間接交易人請求權）的許可性、是否准許請求保護傘損害、因果關係與損害數額的判斷、與懲罰性賠償的角色。損害賠償是深刻的議題。效率分析本身就已深具挑戰性，遑論尚須考量諸如矯正正義等難以量化的價值。筆者希望未來理論與實證研究能強化此一議題的分析，尋求最適合我國的損害賠償體制，以強化競爭法的功能，穩固自由經濟的基礎。

關鍵字

競爭法；公平交易法；反托拉斯；損害；賠償；民事；經濟分析；限制競爭防止法

並列摘要

The purpose of the present study is to identify and address the obstacles faced by the Taiwanese regime of private enforcement of competition law. This study starts by establishing the theoretical functions and importance of private enforcement and introducing the current U.S., EU and Taiwanese regimes of private enforcement. Next, a quantitative survey of damages cases filed in Taiwanese courts and the qualitative results obtained through interviews of practitioners will serve as the bases for the ensuing analyses that identify, and thereafter address, the possible obstacles hindering the effective operation of the Taiwanese regime of competition damages. Finally, this study discusses the problems that might emerge following the removal of the obstacles to private enforcement. This study contributes to the current literature in at least two dimensions. First, it adds to the current theories of the function of private enforcement by elaborating on how private enforcement achieves deterrence and enhancing the efficiency argument for the compensation function. Second, it identifies, quantitatively and qualitatively, the possible problems vis-à-vis undertakings and practitioners that (potentially) wish to pursue damages claims in Taiwan. In the theoretical dimension, I argue that private enforcement benefits the maintainence of competition orders in that (1) it achieves deterrence, by allowing legal consequences against infringers to approach the optimal level in a cost-minimising fashion; and that (2) it achieves compensation, thus promoting ex ante efficiency in resource allocation by potential victims, and enhancing competition ex post by restoring victimised rivals toward the competitiveness but for the anticompetitive behaviour. In the empirical dimension, I find that one of the major obstacles to the present regime rests with the rule that public enforcement does not interrupt limitation periods for damages claims. Such a rule forces victims to commence damages actions before a final public-enforcement decision is rendered, the majority of whom, as the quantitative results show, failed to establish the existence of infringements before civil courts. Another obstacle is related to the current court practice in applying the rules of disclosure of evidence under the Civil Procedure Code, which requires the party requesting disclosure to specify the object of disclosure. Interestingly, the absence of opt-out collective redress mechanisms, which, according to the literature, may have also discouraged damages actions is concluded to be unadvisable, as the role assigned thereto can be performed by public enforcement at a lower cost. In addition, I identify and discuss further issues that can reasonably be expected to emerge in a regime where private enforcement is no longer barred de facto, including the proper interaction between public and private enforcement, the permissibility of the passing-on defence (and thus indirect purchaser standing) and umbrella claims, the assessment of causation and amount of damages, and the role of punitive damages. The issue of private enforcement is a profound and somewhat troubling one. The efficiency analysis is itself a challenging task, let alone the weighing of numerous values that can hardly be quantified, e.g. corrective justice. Future studies, both theoretical and empirical, are undoubtedly needed to establish the optimal private enforcement regime for Taiwan, which will strengthen the role of competition law to secure the foundation of a free economy.