政體與經濟成長關係的再思考：官僚視角的比較分析

Rethinking the Nexus between Political Regime and Economic Growth: A Comparative Perspective from Bureaucrats

楊光(Yang Guang)

指導教授 ： 蔡宗漢

國立政治大學/社會科學學院/政治學系/博士(2022年)

https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202201167

摘要

經濟發展的關鍵因素是什麼？過去研究制度的政治學者強調政體的作用。然而，儘管在兩者關係這一主題上已累積大量理論與實證文獻，但尚無確定答案。此外，經濟發展的實際情形也存在與既有理論相悖之處。鑒於此，本文試圖通過建立一個新架構，來重新檢視政體與經濟成長之間的關聯。
本文認為，政體對經濟發展重要但並非萬能，而納入官僚品質可以更好地解釋經濟成長的異質性。受政體與經濟成長關係之近期研究趨勢的啟發，本文認為通過區分政體的直、間接影響來重新思考兩者關係是合理的。更重要的是，鑑於官僚在國家經濟發展中的重要作用，官僚品質在解釋力上會優於政體間接影響經濟成長的其他中介途徑。
因此，本文從官僚的比較視角提出理論架構：在整個政策過程中，經濟發展作為一系列公共政策的結果，是政治家決策與官僚執行的共同產物。除政體的直接效應外，該架構強調官僚品質在政體與經濟成長的連結中扮演的中介角色，即三者的因果關係應為政體到官僚品質，再到經濟發展。首先，官僚品質受政體影響。在一個更民主的體制下，政治家的權力受到較多約束，因此更傾向以正式制度而非個人意願來處理官僚人事；同時更高的資訊透明度與問責性使公民與社會能更有效地自下而上監督官僚，此兩者有助於增加官僚嚴謹、公正履行職責的能力與意願，即官僚品質更高。
其次，鑑於官僚在國家經濟發展中的關鍵角色，官僚品質對經濟成長至關重要。當政策生效後，負責政策執行官僚機構是否運轉良好，對於能否取得令人滿意的政策結果則變得特別關鍵。較高的官僚品質提供了一個良性循環：官僚嚴謹、公正履行職責確保了投資者對政府的信任，進而增加其投資於有利經濟發展之長期項目的誘因。此外，作為政治家與經濟行為者之間的協調者，公正嚴謹履行職責的官僚往往有更強的能力與誘因來匯集並向政治家傳達有關政策執行的資訊，這能夠幫助政治家修改公共政策，進而提高政策應對不斷變化形勢時的適應能力。因此，基於政體對官僚品質的正向效應及官僚品質對經濟成長的積極影響，本文預期民主體制會通過增加官僚公正、嚴格履行其職責的可能性，間接加快發展的速度。
此外，政體也會通過影響政治家做出有利於經濟發展之決策的誘因，直接影響經濟成長。相較於非民主國家，越民主的體制問責性較高，無論是民眾自下而上的問責，還是不同制度、機構之間的水平監督，都使政治家更有動機去制定支撐長期發展的制度與政策，最終促進國家經濟成長。
為了檢驗上述論述，本文構建了一筆覆蓋全球國家的時間序列橫斷面資料，其中納入品質更高的最新測量指標。複層次模型的結果表明，在過去兩個世紀(1820–2019)中，政體對官僚品質有顯著的積極影響，即在更民主的體制下，官僚更有可能嚴謹、公正地履行職責。此外，涵蓋1900 至 2006 年 202 個國家及地區的複層次中介分析清楚表明，在7個主要大國及全球範圍內，官僚品質在政體與經濟成長之連結中均產生了穩健的中介效應。具體而言，在控制其他可能的影響因素後，政體對經濟成長具有總體效應，其中政體並無顯著的直接影響，但會經由官僚品質產生顯著且穩健的間接影響。
經驗結果證實，官僚品質在政體與經濟發展之連結中的確發揮著關鍵的中介作用。換言之，政體應被視為經濟成長的深層因素，而非直接來源。從此意義上而言，一個政體是否會促進發展，很大程度上取決於其能夠保證官僚在日常工作中嚴謹、公正地履行職責的程度。民主國家之所以較可能出現快速的經濟成長，是因為民主體制下的官僚品質往往更高。
本文從理論與經驗上重新檢視政體與經濟成長之關聯，具有理論及實踐價值。理論層面，通過從官僚的比較角度分析整個政策過程，將大量但分離的研究整合到一個更加連貫的研究議程中，同时對包含政治制度與經濟成長之關係在內的、有關發展的辯論有所貢獻。此外，鑑於官僚對國家發展的重要性，本文的初步分析為未來研究指引了方向，譬如延伸至更多元的官僚特徵、解釋一國內不同區域間的差異與時間趨勢，以及探討官僚如何影響其他社會經濟結果。基於實證結果，本文也建議在實踐中更多地關注官僚與官僚品質，並充分發揮其優勢以作為經濟發展的推動力。

關鍵字

政體 ； 經濟成長 ； 官僚品質 ； 時間序列橫斷面資料 ； 複層次中介分析

並列摘要

What key factors account for economic development? The political regime, emphasized by many scholars who study institutions in the field of political science, is one common answer. However, the nexus between the political regime and economic growth has sizeable theoretical and empirical literature without a settled answer. Moreover, the reality of economic development seems to go against conventional wisdom. Given these, this dissertation seeks to rethink the nexus between the political regime and economic growth by establishing a new framework.
This dissertation argues that the political regime matters to growth but is not omnipotent, whereas it can help us better understand the variation in growth by considering the role of bureaucratic quality. Inspired by an impressive recent research trend, this dissertation claims that it is reasonable to rethink the political regime and growth nexus by distinguishing the direct and indirect impacts of the political regime. More importantly, bureaucratic quality should be superior to other mediated channels through which the political regime indirectly influences economic growth in view of the important role of bureaucrats in national economic development.
This dissertation proposes a theoretical framework via a comparative perspective from bureaucrats. In this framework, economic growth, as an outcome of a package of public policies, is a co-production of politicians’ policy-making and bureaucrats’ policy implementation. In addition to the direct effect of the political regime on growth, this framework emphasizes that bureaucratic quality plays a role as the key mediator of the nexus between the political regime and economic growth. In other words, the causal arrow should run from the political regime to bureaucratic quality to economic development.
First, bureaucratic quality is shaped by the political regime. A more democratic system tends to have a higher level of bureaucratic quality, because more restrictions on politicians’ power concerning bureaucratic personnel, as well as bottom-up effective monitoring from citizens based on a higher level of information transparency and accountability, increase the capability and incentives of bureaucrats to perform their duties rigorously and impartially.
Second, considering the role of bureaucrats in national economic development, bureaucratic quality is vital to growth. When policies come into effect, a well-functioning bureaucracy responsible for their implementation becomes especially important for a satisfactory policy outcome. Higher bureaucratic quality provides a virtuous circle, in which rigorous and impartial bureaucrats secure investors’ trust in the government and give them stronger incentives to invest in economically conducive long-term programs. In addition, as coordinators between politicians and economic actors, bureaucrats who impartially perform their duties often have greater ability and motivation to collect and convey information about policy implementation to politicians, which in turn can help politicians to modify public policies and improve their adaptability to changing situations. Therefore, in view of the positive effect of the political regime on bureaucratic quality and the positive impact of bureaucratic quality on growth, the political regime is supposed to indirectly boost the tempo of development by increasing the possibility that bureaucrats perform their duties impartially and rigorously.
Furthermore, the political regime directly impacts economic growth by shaping the incentives of politicians to make decisions conducive to national economic development. Compared with non-democratic regimes, more democratic regimes tend to have higher levels of accountability, both vertical and horizontal, which in turn provides greater incentives for politicians to initiate and reform institutions and policies that support long-term development, and ultimately spur economic growth.
This dissertation constructs a global panel to test these claims empirically. The time-series cross-sectional data compose the latest indicators with higher levels of measurement quality. The results drawn from multilevel models show that the political regime positively affects bureaucratic quality during the past two centuries (1820–2019): Bureaucrats under more democratic regimes are more likely to rigorously and impartially perform their duties. Moreover, multilevel mediation analyses of data from 202 countries over the period 1900–2006 clearly demonstrate a robust mediated effect of bureaucratic quality, both in seven great powers and globally. More specifically, after controlling for other determinants, the political regime has a total impact on economic growth, including an insignificant direct impact and a significant, robust, and indirect effect through bureaucratic quality.
These empirical findings confirm that bureaucratic quality plays a crucial role as a mediator in the nexus between the political regime and economic development. In other words, the political regime should be considered a deep determinant of growth rather than an immediate source. In this sense, whether a political regime can enhance growth largely depends on the extent to which it ensures that bureaucrats impartially and rigorously perform their duties in day-to-day work. Rapid economic growth is more likely to be observed in more democratic countries because higher levels of democracy can promote bureaucratic quality.
This dissertation makes contributions to the academic and practical fields. Using a comparative perspective from bureaucrats, this framework brings a large but disparate collection of research together into a coherent research agenda. It contributes to the debates about development, including but not limited to the nexus between the political regime and growth. Furthermore, this preliminary analysis offers several directions for future research, including the effects of various bureaucratic characteristics, regional variations and time trends within a specific country, and how bureaucrats influence other socio-economic outcomes. Regarding political practice, this dissertation proposes that bureaucrats should be given more attention and their advantages fully utilized.

並列關鍵字

Political regime ； Economic growth ； Bureaucratic quality ； Time-series cross-sectional data ； Multilevel mediation analysis

參考文獻

Acemoglu, Daron. 2008. Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo García-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson. 2015. “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach.” American Economic Review 105 (8): 2364–409.

Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2019. “Democracy Does Cause Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 127 (1): 47–100.

Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2011. “Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States.” Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (2): 177–208.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.