經理人能力與股東股利稅負敏感度

Managerial Ability and the Shareholder Tax Sensitivity of Dividends – Evidence from Taiwan

張䅨芷(Zhang Xiang-Zhi)

指導教授 ： 何怡澄 ； 郭振雄

國立政治大學/社會科學學院/財政學系/碩士(2020年)

https://doi.org/10.6814/NCCU202000571

摘要

本文探討股東股利稅負懲罰(Tax Penalty)與企業股利策略關聯性；此外，探討經理人能力(Managerial Ability)與企業股利策略關聯性；最後，探討經理人能力與股東股利稅負敏感度關聯性，並分析影響股利發放率之企業特性與營運策略制定。
過去文獻對於影響股利發放策略的因素未有一個定論，Guan, Li, and Ma (2018)特此考量經理人能力對股利稅負懲罰與股利發放率影響，而本文參考Guan et al. (2018)考量經理人能力對股東股利稅負敏感度的影響，並根據臺灣的股利稅制情況做調整，也因不同股東類型適用不同的稅率，故以加權平均的方式計算整體股利稅負懲罰。
本文採用1995年至2014年之臺灣上市櫃資料進行分析。實證結果顯示，首先，在不考慮經理人能力的情況下，股利稅負懲罰與股利發放率間具負向關聯性；其次，在不考慮股利稅負懲罰的情況下，經理人能力與股利發放率間的關聯性具正向關聯性；第三，經理人能力對股利稅負懲罰與股利發放率的調節作用為負，表示高能力經理人制定股利發放策略時，會考慮股東的租稅負擔情況；第四，經理人能力與股利與股票購回替代之稅負敏感度具有正向關聯性；最後，當1998年與2010年稅制改革發生時，此兩個時期對股利來說，皆為降稅之效果，故高能力經理人會增加股利的發放。因此能夠得到以下結論：高能力經理人能夠制定具有租稅效率之股利發放政策。

關鍵字

股利稅負懲罰 ； 經理人能力 ； 股利發放政策

並列摘要

This paper aims to examine the relationship between shareholder dividend tax penalties and dividend payout policy, to explore the relationship between managerial ability and dividend payout policy, and to examine the relationship between managerial ability and the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends. This paper also analyzes the factors that affect the dividend payout ratio, such as enterprise characteristics and business strategy.
In prior literature, there was no conclusion on the factors that affect the dividend payout policy. Guan, Li, and Ma (2018) considered the effect of managerial ability on the dividend tax penalty and dividend payout ratio. According to Guan et al. (2018), this paper measures the influence of managerial ability on the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends and adjusts with the dividend taxation system in Taiwan. Also, different types of shareholders apply to different tax rates, so this paper measures the tax penalty with the shareholding-weighted tax penalty.
This paper collects publicly available data of dividend payouts by publicly traded companies in Taiwan between 1995 and 2014. The empirical results show that without considering managerial ability, there is a negative correlation between the dividend tax penalty and the dividend payout ratio. Second, without considering the dividend tax penalty, the correlation between managerial ability and the dividend payout ratio is positive. Third, the reflection of the dividend tax penalty and the managerial ability on the dividend payout ratio is negative, which indicates that high-ability managers would consider the shareholder's tax burden when making the dividend payment policy. Fourth, the managerial ability is positively correlated with the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividend-repurchase substitutions. Finally, there is the effect of tax cuts in two tax reform periods took place in 1998 and 2010. High-ability managers would increase the distribution of dividends. Therefore, the following conclusions can be drawn: high-ability managers can make dividend payment policies that are tax-efficient.

並列關鍵字

Dividend Tax Penalties ； Managerial Ability ； Dividend Payout Policy

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