我國股東代表訴訟之探討

我國公司法股東代表訴訟之設計原意，乃在於填補公司損害、嚇阻董事不法，以達成強化公司治理之目標。然而立法設計之初，因顧慮股東可能藉由代表訴訟干擾公司正常經營，而設下嚴格起訴條件與賠償責任，導致股東起訴意願低落，實務上案件鮮少。除該制度原先具有之機能大幅萎縮外，其所企求促進公司治理之目的也因此落空。民國98年，立法機關為求達成保護證券投資人及期貨交易人權益，並促進證券期貨市場健全發展之目的。乃增訂證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法第10條之1，希冀透過公益性質之投保中心在主管機關的監理下，對不法之董事、監察人提起代表訴訟，以改善實務運作不夠普及之現況。民國109年，證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法第10條之1修正，明定投保中心提起訴訟之發動事由與擴大究責對象，杜絕先前實務運作上的爭議並進一步提升代表訴訟之機能。本文主要透過美國法上股東代表訴訟制度之介紹，並藉此與我國公司法代表訴訟進行比較分析。另外，由於證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法第10條之1與公司法代表訴訟性質相同，故將一併進行檢討並提出建議，期為未來股東代表訴訟之修法提供些許助益。

關鍵字

公司治理；股東代表訴訟；公司法第214條；證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法第10條之1

並列摘要

The original intention for the enactment of Article 214 (shareholder derivative action) of Taiwan Company Act is to indemnify the company for the damages suffered and to deter directors from committing illegal acts for the purpose of achieving the goal of strengthening corporate governance. However, due to concerns that shareholders might interfere with the daily operation of the company through derivative action, rigorous conditions and heavy liability were imposed on the shareholders who initiate derivative action, thus deterring shareholders' willingness to sue and resulting in few cases were brought in court. As a consequence the original functions of derivative action were significantly decreased. The goal for promoting corporate governance has also failed. In 2009 the legislature sought to protect the rights and interests of securities investors and futures traders and to promote sound development of the securities and futures markets, Article 10-1 was added to the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act. Under the supervision of the competent authority a new unit, the Protection Institution, was established, the goal of which would be to file derivative action against unlawful directors and supervisors to rectify the current problem of lack of derivative action. In 2020, Article 10-1 of the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act was amended setting forth additional grounds for the Protection Institution to bring derivative action and expanding the targets for imposing liability. The new section also eliminates existing ambiguous legal issues and further enhances the function of derivative action. This article mainly introduces the shareholder derivative action in Taiwan and in the United States and compares the differences between these two systems. In addition, since Article 10-1 of the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act has more detailed regulation than the derivative action regulation provided in the Taiwan Company Act, the latter will be examined altogether and recommendations will also be made, hoping to provide some guidance to the revision of Article 214 of Taiwan Company Act in the future.