薪酬差異與權益資金成本－代理問題之探討

近年針對高階管理階層與員工薪酬支付不公平的議題，受到各界廣泛重視，許多國家以強制揭露總經理與員工薪酬中位數比率作為因應方法。有鑒於此，本文針對新興市場－臺灣，以高階管理者對員工每人平均薪酬的比率衡量薪酬差異，研究薪酬差異與權益資金成本間的關聯性，探討薪酬差異是否會影響投資者的要求報酬，為增加薪酬資訊透明度的政策是否具意義提供證據。本研究以臺灣2008年至2018年上市公司為研究對象，實證結果發現，薪酬差異與權益資金成本呈顯著正相關，支持管理者權力理論，反映投資人在面對越高的薪酬差異時，越會認為公司有管理據守的問題，而要求公司提供越高的報酬。此外，外資法人持股比例會降低薪酬差異與權益資金成本間的正向關係，表示當外部監督越強、代理問題越不嚴重時，能夠使兩者間的正向相關顯著降低。

關鍵字

薪酬差異；權益資金成本；代理問題

並列摘要

Recently, the income inequality between top managers pay and employees pay has become a growing public concern. Many countries have adopted mandatory disclosure of pay ratio as a response. Our research focuses on the association between pay disparity, measured as top managers’ average pay divided by employees’ average pay, and cost of equity capital in Taiwan, an emerging market economy. To investigate whether the pay disparity will affect investors’ required rate of return, providing further evidence if the pay disclosure policies are meaningful or not. Using observations of firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation from 2008 to 2018, this paper finds a significantly positive relation between pay disparity and cost of equity capital. The result supports the hypothesis developed by managerial power theory that investors regard larger pay disparity as management entrenchment associated with severe agency problem, and thus ask for higher returns on investments. Further analysis shows that the significantly positive association between pay disparity and cost of equity capital is weaker when foreign institutional investors hold more shares. This result suggests that corporate governance which is used to curb agency problem can reduce the positive association.