資本結構與代理成本之相關性研究及其決定因素

An Empirical Study of the Relation Between Capital Structure and Agency Costs and their Determinants

游家杰(Jia-Jye Yu)

指導教授 ： 鍾麗英

元智大學/管理學院/管理研究所/碩士(2001年)

摘要

本研究以MIMIC模型測試資本結構及代理成本之決定因素，為了檢測資本結構與代理成本之相關性，特別是代理成本對資本結構之影響。本研究並進一步整合兩個決定因素MIMIC模型，以建立一個雙向系統之MIMIC模型。在MIMIC模型中，兩個資本結構以及兩個代理成本之因素變數對資本結構及代理成本有顯著之效果。此外，在整合的MIMIC模型結果中顯示資本結構影響代理成本，反之亦然。顯著的因素變數係數包括，營業淨利對總資產比率，非稅盾效果對總資產的比率，資本支出對總資產的比率，以及總資產之自然對數值。而三個資本結構之顯著代理變數為長期負債及可轉換公司債除以權益的帳面值或市值。兩個代理成本之顯著代理變數為證券分析師推薦次數，及由管理當局報導之公司部門數。

關鍵字

資本結構 ； 代理成本 ； 結構方程模式

並列摘要

This study tests an integrated framework of determinants of capital structure choice and agency costs in terms of multiple indicators and multiple causes (MIMIC) model. To examine the relation between capital structure and agency costs, focusing on whether agency costs affects capital structure. It also further integrated the two determinants MIMIC model to develop MIMIC models under a non-recursive system. In MIMIC model, two proposed cause variables of capital structure and two proposed cause variables of agency costs have significant effect on capital structure and agency costs. In addition, the results of integrative MIMIC models show that capital structure affects agency costs, and vice versa. The significant cause variables include the coefficient of the ratio of operating income to total assets, the ratio of non-debt tax shields to total assets, the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets, and natural logarithm of total assets. Three significant indicators of capital structure are long-term debt and convertible debt denominated by either market value or book value of equity. Two significant indicators of agency costs are the number of securities analyst following and the number of segment reported by management.

並列關鍵字

Capital Sturcture ； Agency Costs ； Structural Equation Modeling

參考文獻

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