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  • 學位論文

探討公司採取抵抗措施與公司控制之關係

Defensive Techniques and Corporate Control

指導教授 : 沈仰斌
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摘要


本文以1988~2004年在美國三大市場(AMEX, NYSE 和NASDAQ)發生委託書爭奪戰的上市公司為樣本,探討公司持有超額現金以及公司採取抵抗措施對委託書爭奪戰結果的影響。在我們的觀點中,我們認為現金的多寡可能是影響委託書爭奪戰結果的重要變數,實證結果發現市場派獲勝時,目標公司所持有的現金是比較多的,因此仍然是支持代理問題假說;當我們加入抵抗手段的控制變數後,我們發現當公司採取直接影響股權的方式是最直接且有效的。此外,本文亦針對事後表現進行研究,我們發現公司持有較多現金,事後的表現會較差;當市場派獲勝且公司持有較多現金,事後的表現會是最差的,這也意謂著爭奪戰期間可能市場有非理性的預期以及過度反應所造成。

並列摘要


This paper analyzes a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors in the 1988-2004 period. Even if cash-rich firms are more likely to become the targets of proxy contests. In our opinion, the takeover-deterrence effects of excess cash may be an important variable which could influence the results of proxy contests. We find that the result of proxy contest which dissident victory holds more cash than management victory, and REPO Variable (directly affects the outcome of proxy contests through its effect on the distribution of votes) is the most significant factor in increasing the probability of dissident success in proxy contests. We also find that when the dissidents succeed in a proxy contest and it’s a cash-rich firm, abnormal returns following the proxy contest are significantly negative. This suggests that, in cases where dissidents win and with higher cash holding, the market has unrealistic expectations and investor overreaction around proxy contests.

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