探討員工認股權之資訊不對稱、盈餘管理及公司績效情況之研究

Earnings Management, Information Asymmetry and the Performance of stock Options

王薳玄(Wei-Hsuan Wang)

指導教授 ： 夏侯欣榮

元智大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2005年)

摘要

本篇論文主要研究兩項主題：(1)發給CEOs的員工認股權數量與公司資訊不對稱環境及盈餘操弄之間的關係；(2)員工認股權的多寡與營運績效表現的雙重效果對股票市場的影響。針對第一項實證結果顯示，公司內部的資訊不對稱程度愈低愈會發行更多的員工認股權；發愈多員工認股權的公司的確會使管理者從事盈餘管理的手段；這項結果支持盈餘管理假說(Healy,1985)但資訊假說則不被支持。本篇第二項關於績效表現的證據顯示，員工認股權發行數量愈多，愈能促使營運績效改善，結果與Hideaki et al (2004)一致並且營運績效的改善顯示在公司的營運現金流量，在資產報酬率上則沒有顯著的影響；本篇論文進一步考慮盈餘管理對營運績效、市場績效的影響，實證顯示當公司有盈餘操弄時(向上操弄盈餘)，發行員工認股權的數量愈多並且確實改善營運現金流量的公司會有較高的市場超額報酬相較於發行量少的公司，並且股票市場並不會對公司資產報酬率有顯著的反應，這是來自於美國股票市場是為完全效率市場，表示投資人知道公司盈餘管理會使得盈餘不正確並連帶影響資產報酬率，而營運現金流量則比較不易受盈餘管理的影響，因此投資人會對營運現金流量好壞做反應；相對來說，當公司盈餘操弄較少時，股票市場會對發行員工認股權多並且資產報酬率改善的公司有正向的反應，因為此時公司的盈餘是正確的，而盈餘是最能反應一家公司營運績效的指標，所以股票市場對營運績效反應會顯著反應在資產報酬率上而不是營運現金流量。

關鍵字

員工認股權 ； 盈餘管理 ； 資訊不對稱 ； 公司績效 ； 市場績效 ； 營運績效

並列摘要

This thesis studies two main investigations. One is the relation among the amounts of granting executive stock options (ESO), information asymmetry, and the earnings management. Another subject is to examine that stock market reacts to the comprehensive effects of the amounts of ESO and improvement in operating performance. The results provide that firms with higher information transparency grant fewer ESO and manage more earnings following granting ESO. The results do not consist with information hypothesis but support the earnings management hypothesis (Healy,1985). The operating performance actually improves owning to undertake ESO but it only represents in cash flows from operations, which support the prior researches (Hideaki et al., 2004). Furthermore, this study adds earnings management in measurement of performance. On the premise of market efficiency and granting ESO making market reaction good, the existence of higher earnings management induces the cash flows from operations (CFO) being the better target of the corporate performance and stock market reacts to CFO instead of ROA. On the contrary if firms have lower earnings management, ROA can reflect the corporate performance and stock market reacts to ROA. The evidences are consistent with the hypothesis in this thesis.

並列關鍵字

Executive stock options ； Earnings Management ； Information Asymmetry ； Corporate Performance ； Market Performance ； Operating Performance

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