- 學位論文
高階經理人員工認股權與股價異常報酬之研究-以電子業為例
Executive Stock Option and Abnormal Stock Returns - Evidence from Electronic Industry
摘要
本研究主要探討國內發放員工認股權的上市櫃電子業公司，其高階經理人是否為獲得員工認股權之利益，進而在給予日與執行日消息面的操縱或從事盈餘管理等行為，以達到操縱股價之目的。由於員工股票選擇權的履約價格必須至少等於給予日股票當時的收盤價。因此購買股票之履約價格訂得越低或者是未來行使選擇權時股票的市價越高，員工所獲得的薪資報酬亦越高。 在給予日與股價異常報酬之研究以民國90-95年為研究期間，其對象針對台灣上市櫃公司電子業中已實際發放員工認股權證給高階經理人者，共計284個員工認股權授與日。在探討執行日與股價異常報酬之研究，以台灣上市櫃公司的電子業曾於民國93年5月至95年間有高階經理人執行員工認股權者，共有353筆高階經理人執行日觀察值，並進一步探討有董事長、總經理及CEO執行員工認股權者，是否有盈餘管理之情形。本研究以事件研究法與Modified Jone’s Model 做為衡量高階經理人是否操縱的方法。 本研究結果為員工認股權給予日前股價累積異常報酬率為負，而員工認股權給予日後股價累積異常報酬率為正。且發行員工認股權給高階經理人的電子公司，部份會利用公開資訊觀測站重大訊息之宣佈來操縱股價，且有延遲發佈好消息或者提前發佈壞消息的情形，以達到給予日當天股價為最低點。且本研究未發現高階經理人在執行員工認股權前，股價累積異常為負；但在執行員工認股權後，股價累積異常報酬為正。另本研究未發現有董事長、總經理及CEO執行員工認股權的電子公司，其執行當年度發佈之年報，有盈餘管理之情形；有董事長、總經理及CEO執行員工認股權之電子公司，後一年年度發佈之年報，有董事長、總經理及CEO執行員工認股權公司會採用較高裁決性應計項目，亦即董事長、總經理及CEO執行員工認股權後所發佈的財務報表有盈餘管理之情形。
並列摘要
This study attempts to examine whether the top management of the publicly listed electronic companies in Taiwan are beneficial or not for implementing the Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOP) on the granting day or executing day to manage the earnings and manipulate the stock prices of the company. First, this study examines the relationship between ESOP and the abnormality of stock returns on the granting day, this investigation utilizes 284 samples of electronic firms in Taiwan which implements ESOP from January 2001 to December 2006 to examine whether there is an abnormality of stock return on the day of granting stock options. This study then collects 353 top managements of electronic firms who exercising ESOP from May 2004 to December 2006 for exploring the relationship between the abnormality of stock return and Chairman, President as well as CEO’s earnings management on the day of exercising stock option. This work uses calendar-time approach and the modified Jone’s Model to measure whether the top management manipulates the management earnings and stock prices of the company. The empirical results are summarized as follows: (1) there is a negatively abnormal return before the day on which the company granted ESOP and it has a positively abnormal return after that day. (2) there are positively abnormal stock returns during the post-exercising period. (3) the top management of the electronic companies inclined to postpone announcing the good news to public and to advance declaring the bad news to investors thru the Market Observation Post System. This investigation does not find top managements significantly utilize the accruals to manage earnings of the company during the exercising period. However, the finding indicates that the top managements inclined to utilize the accruals to manage the earnings of the company during the post-exercising period.