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  • 學位論文

加盟體系附加價值最適投入之分析

Service and Brand Investments of Franchising Systems

指導教授 : 曾盛恕
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摘要


加盟體系附加價值最適投入之分析 研究生:鍾榮國 指導教授:曾盛恕 元 智 大 學 管理研究所 摘要 憑藉著規模經濟與勞動婦女參與以及中年二度就業的風氣漸起,使得連鎖加盟業已成為商業競爭中最重要的擴張方式之一。企業為獲得競爭優勢必須與價值鏈上的成員建立良好的合夥關係,因此加盟主應當思索如何與其加盟者建立良好的合作關係。本研究有兩個主要的目的:一是求得加盟體系之附加價值的最適投入為何 二是提供加盟主如何增進與加盟者的溝通以及合作關係。 首先我們將注意力放在加盟體系附加價值的投入量以及投入之有效性上,接著利用經濟模型假設與推導,我們試圖對加盟體系的問題與現象進行分析。其中在加盟主的品牌投入與加盟者的服務投入的考量,以及市場競爭的情況之下,我們得到加盟體系之最適投入與市場均衡價格,以及加盟主提供其加盟者提高其服務投入的動機,動機包括:1.加盟主藉由訓練與教育,改善其加盟者服務投入的品質並提高其服務最適投入水準2.加盟主利用低權利金比率誘使加盟者增加其服務投入3.加盟主改善其廣告之投入方式,使得消費者的單位貨幣之廣告效用提高,當市場均衡價格因而升高的同時,加盟者的最適服務投入也會因價格的升高而增加4.加盟主訂定較高的銷售價格,將誘使其加盟店投入過高的服務水準(高於均衡價格下的最適投入水準)。我們並利用模型的結果試著對網路廣告的衰退原因進行分析。 最後我們提出此研究模型的限制,以做為日後改進的方向。

並列摘要


Abstract For economy of scale, increasing labor participation of housewives and middle age crisis concern, franchising becomes an eminent business format for expansion in today’s business horizontal. To build competitive advantages in the value-chain, franchisers need to cooperate with their associated franchisees by improving the relationship in between. The objectives of the present study are twofold: firstly, the investigation of the input level to maximize the added value of the franchise, and secondly, how can the franchiser enhance the cooperative relationship with franchisees. To those ends, we firstly focus on the issues of the level of the input factors and the efficacy. Secondly, with economic assumptions and modeling, we construct a mathematic model to investigate the problems that may exist in a typical franchise. Through the concerning of factors of the branding by the franchiser and the service level by the franchisee and the price competition of product market, we derive the product price equilibrium and the optimal level of branding and service. The modeling results also render in several managerial implications for the franchiser to motivate their franchisees. They are: 1. The provision of on-job training may help to entice the franchisee to enlarge its service. 2. Franchiser may induce franchisee’s service level by lowing the rate of royalty. 3. If franchisers increase branding by increasing the advertising budget, consumers’ monetary utility of advertising maybe increased, as a result, the equilibrium price of product is increased. Hence, franchisees’ service level is also induced. 4. If franchiser can increase the product price, it may help to entice the franchisee to invest with higher service level (i.e., more than the equilibrium price). Finally, we utilize the model to analyze the declining of internet advertisement. The limits of the modeling are drawn at the end for further research.

參考文獻


1. Chong-en Bai & Zhigang Tao,“ Contract Mixing in Franchising as a Mechanism for Public-Good Provision”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol 9, p85-113, 2000.
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