高科技公司技術升級與競爭：實質選擇權分析

Technology Progressing and Competition among Hi-Tech Firms: Real Options Analysis

江岳龍(Yueh-Lung Chiang)

指導教授 ： 郭文忠 ； 徐學忍

元智大學/管理學院/管理研究所/碩士(2001年)

摘要

高科技企業為獲得持久性競爭優勢，不斷投資於技術升級活動，是不可獲缺之關鍵。然而於高度不確定之產業環境下，為達成技術升級目標並對企業資源做最有效配置，精確的資本預算方法是必備條件。本研究經文獻探討發現，傳統資本預算之淨現值法，忽略高度不確定性下之不可撤銷與可延遲投資行為特質，且未將投資決策之管理彈性納入考慮，使得淨現值法低估投資方案之實際價值。於現今新興之資本預算方法中，考慮市場成長機會及經營彈性成本之實質選擇權評價方法，可適切地描述不確定性下之企業投資決策，並突顯投資管理彈性之價值。
本研究擬以實質選擇權資本預算方法，應用於高科技產業廠商進行製程創新技術升級投資計畫之評價。並以Cournot模型及廠商雙方技術升級競爭型態為分析架構，試圖將廠商之競爭活動與技術升級先佔優勢引入評價模型中，並考慮成本領導優勢之存在性，市場需求不確定性、廠商投資決策之管理彈性與不可撤銷性。本研究利用動態規劃分析方法及向前歸納法(backward induction)，求算出於兩種技術升級路徑及三個技術階段下廠商技術升級投資計畫價值之封閉解(close form)、投資決策準則以及技術升級路徑之實現條件。
本研究發現，於廠商均進行技術升級活動之技術階段下，市場需求價格、保留價格過程之趨勢率及波動度、需求價格低限，與投資計畫價值呈正相關；而技術升級後之邊際生產成本、折現率與投資計畫價值呈負相關。本研究亦利用數值分析方法，試圖探討各參數變動對於市場均衡價格以及投資決策之影響。結果發現，成本領導廠商與非成本領導廠商成本降低的程度愈高，將增加成本領導廠商獲得技術領先地位之動機，並使企業之投資門檻降低。折現率、需求曲線斜率及投資於技術升級活動之沉沒成本的增加，將減少成本領導廠商處於技術領先之機會，並提高企業投資之門檻。

關鍵字

產業經濟 ； 實質選擇權 ； 高科技產業 ； 動態規劃 ； 技術升級 ； 投資門檻 ； 製程創新 ； 科諾雙佔模型

並列摘要

In high-tech industry, the key factor to obtain the sustainable competitive advantage is continually investing in technology progressing. However, in the highly uncertain environment, the precise capital budgeting is indispensable to aim technology progressing and allocate the source optimally. In our literature review, traditional DCF approach neglects the irreversibility and deferability of investment under uncertainty and do not consider the managerial flexibility of investment decision. Therefore, the DCF approach usually undervalues the intrinsic value of the investment project. Real option, one of modern capital budgeting approach, takes account for opportunities and cost of flexibility and captures the uncertainty while managers make invest decision.
This study applies the real options concept to evaluation of process innovating projects of technology progressing in high-tech industry. To consider strategic interaction and preemptive advantage of technology progressing race, we use Cournot model and competitive patterns of technology progressing as our research framework. Besides, cost leadership advantage, uncertainty of market demand, managerial flexibility and irreversibility also are in our consideration. In this model, by dynamic programming and backward induction, we obtained the close form solutions of firms’ value functions, investment thresholds in three stages of two different technology progressing paths and the conditions of realization of technology progressing path.
We find that the demand price, drift and volatility of reservation price and low bar of demand price are positive to project value. Marginal cost after technology progressing and discount rate are negative to project function. Besides, by numeral analysis, this study tries to explore the inferences of changes in various parameters to market equilibrium price and investment decisions. We find that the increase in the degree of cost reduction of cost leader and non-cost leader will not only enforce the cost leader be a technology leader but lower the investment threshold. The increases in discount rate, in slope of demand curve and in the sunk cost of technology progressing project will reduce the probability of that cost leader be a technology leader and increase the investment threshold.

並列關鍵字

Industrial economics ； Real options ； Hi-Tech industry ； Dynamic programming ； Technology progressing ； Invest threshold ； Process innovation ； Cournot duopoly model

參考文獻

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