信任在外包關係管理的角色-以不同權力位階的台灣高科技廠商做比較

The Role of Trust in Subcontracting Network Management in Different Power: A comparison analysis with Hi-tech corporations in Taiwan

林敬堯(Ching-Yao Lin)

指導教授 ： 羅家德 ； 湯玲郎 ； 邱宏仁

元智大學/資訊學院/資訊社會學研究所/碩士(2003年)

摘要

台灣高科技產業網絡會有今日的穩定，乃是基於高科技廠商與外包商之間的外包關係管理之功。台灣高科技公司在面對外包關係維持的態度，強調的是合作關係的長久及穩定，詬病的是合作對象的隨意替換。在此強調長期合作關係重要的情況之下，外包關係管理對台灣高科技廠商而言，乃是一門重要的課題及影響公司競爭力的策略。然而在台灣高科技產業網絡的分工邏輯中，大部份是靠信任關係來與外包商之間來進行交易。因此本研究以交易成本出發，並加入資源依賴論的觀點，同時配合著鑲嵌理論的論述，探討並歸納不同權力位階的台灣高科技廠商，在外包關係中若發生單價降低要求、插單要求、品質不良、水平外包及淡季等危機風險時，權力位階不同的外包雙方，其信任、權力及法律等保障措施的因應是否不同。
本研究採用質化研究方法，歸納不同權力位階的高科技廠商，其信任在外包關係管理中的角色為何。在經由分析結果發現，外包關係中權力位階高的一方，除了在單價降低要求、插單要求等兩方面會運用權力運作外，在品質不良、水平外包及淡季等危機風險時，皆運用信任機制在維持雙方合作關係。同時也發現，權力位階愈對等的同時，信任在雙方合作關係中，所扮演的角色則愈重要，以及此次的權力運作、信任配合皆為下次合作的評比及考量。

關鍵字

交易成本 ； 資源依賴論 ； 鑲嵌理論 ； 信任 ； 權力 ； 危機風險

並列摘要

Abstract
Due to the outsourcing relationship management between high-tech corporations and their subcontractors, The networks of Taiwanese high-tech industries become stabilized. These high-tech corporations highlight the permanent and stable partnership instead of short-term arbitrary relationship when managing their outsourcing contracts. Under these circumstances, the outsourcing relationship management is very important and strategic to the competitiveness of Taiwanese high tech firms. However, most transactions or cooperation between firms rely on the trust in the Taiwanese high-tech industrial networks. My research framework combines the transaction cost approach, the resource dependency theory and the embedded-network theory. Applying this framework and using qualitative research methods, I focus on different high-tech firms in the same outsourcing contractual partnership which also turns the firms into different power hierarchy. Then I study the changes of trust, power and the legal protections of different firms while different types of crisis risks raising in the contractual partnership.
The analysis shows that on the one hand, the firms within the higher position of power hierarchy will use trust to maintain the cooperative relationship while facing the crisis risks of inferior quality, parallel outsourcing and slack season. Moreover, they will use power to maintain the cooperative relationship while facing the crisis risks of cost-down and orders for emergency. The results also suggest that the trust will play a significant role in the cooperative relationship while the power hierarchy between firms is more equal. The power and the trust of previous contractual relationship are two important indicators of evaluation for the next time cooperation.

並列關鍵字

Transaction Cost ； Resource Dependent theory ； Embedded ； Trust ； Power ； Risk of Crisis

參考文獻

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