市場競爭對台灣廠商投資決策與財務結構之影響 － 以台灣上市公司為例

The Effects of Market Competition on a Firm’s Financing and Investment Strategies － Empirical Evidence in Taiwan

林敬凱(Ching - Kai Lin)

指導教授 ： 李丹

元智大學/管理學院/國際企業學系/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6838/YZU.2008.00250

摘要

企業的投資規模與資本結構二者如何受到市場結構的影響，是近年來很多學者研究的重點，但是這些研究的內容多為市場結構對投資的影響或是市場結構對資本結構的影響，顯少有人同時將這三項因素納入考慮。有鑑於此，本研究將同時考慮企業投資與資本結構二者的交互影響作用，檢驗市場結構如何影響之。本研究以台灣上市公司18個產業為樣本，實證研究1999-2006年間資本結構是如何分別的影響公司的投資策略與財務槓桿。使用的計量模型以ordinary least squares method (OLS) 與two stages least square method (2SLS)為主，OLS檢驗在不考慮企業投資與財務槓桿的相互影響下，市場競爭如何影響之；2SLS檢驗考慮企業投資與財務槓桿的相互影響下市場競爭又如何影響之。
　　我們的實證結果顯示，當市場競爭狀況越為激烈時，企業將會減少投資規模　（且競爭程度對於投資的間接影響大於直接影響），這意味管理當局會等待未來更好的時機才進行投資；另外，當市場競爭狀況越為激烈時，管理當局反而會增加公司的負債水平 (且競爭程度對於財務槓桿的直接影響大於間接影響)，這說明了管理者為平衡公司總風險情況下所產生的結果，以及資訊不對稱下安撫外部人士所釋放的訊息。最後本研究亦發現，公司的投資策略與財務槓桿二者不但互為影響，且都為負向的影響。

關鍵字

投資 ； 資本結構 ； 市場競程

並列摘要

How market structure influences a company’s investment scale and capital structure is always an important issue in the literature. However, most extant studies only focus impact of market structure on investment or capital structure, but not both. By contrast, we assert that this study examines how market structure affects both investment and capital structure assuming the two decisions interact with each other. This study employs samples drawn from TSEC (Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation) listed companies of 18 industries from 1999 to 2006. We use both ordinary least squares method (OLS) and two stages least square method (2SLS) in this study. We investigate how competition affects a firms financing strategy assuming a reduced-form equation which ignores the interaction effect between investment and financial strategy when conducting the OLS regression. By contrast, a simultaneous setting is incorporated when we conduct the 2SLS regression. Same research method is adopted in investigating how competition affects a firm's investment strategy
Our empirical results indicate that when market competition is more intensive, companies tend to reduce their investment. This means that managers tend to be more conservative when facing intensive market. In contrast, when the market competition was more intensive, managers tend to increase the company’s debt level. Moreover, we find two effects contribute to the negative competition–investment relation. First, market competition directly increases investment. Second, market competition increases the debt level, and thus indirectly reduces the investment scale. To compensate for this, the firm’s manager will be more conservative in exercising the investment plan. Similarly, there are two effects contribute to the positive competition-debt level relation. First, market competition directly increases firm’s debt level. Second, market competition increases the investment, and thus indirectly reduces the debt level. To compensate for this, the firm’s manager will increase financial leverage. Lastly this study also found that the company’s investment strategy and financial leverage not only affected each other, but also negatively.

並列關鍵字

investment scale ； capital structure ； market structure ； leverage

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