實質盈餘管理與未來營運績效之關連性分析

The Association between Real Earnings Management and Future Operating Performance

張鈺詩(Yu-Shih Chang)

指導教授 ： 王瑄

元智大學/管理學院/商學碩士班(會計學程)/碩士(2011年)

摘要

本研究旨在探討實質盈餘管理與未來營運績效之關連性，並比較實質盈餘管理與應計盈餘管理對於未來營運績效之意涵是否相同。企業進行盈餘管理行為若在後續期間被投資人發現，將會遭受嚴重之懲罰，因此本研究推論，若企業選擇以盈餘管理行為達成盈餘門檻，則表示企業未來實質經營績效會有顯著之改善，方能隱藏本期盈餘管理反轉後對後續績效之負面影響。此外，若企業選擇進行成本較高、影響期間較長之實質盈餘管理行為，其後續實質績效改善相對於選擇進行應計盈餘管理企業，前者之程度應該較強，且改善期間應較長。本研究採用Dechow et al. (1995)之Modified Jones Model衡量應計項目之盈餘管理；並採用Roychowdhury (2006)作法估計實質盈餘管理行為。本研究實證發現透過實質盈餘管理達成盈餘門檻之企業，相對於未達成盈餘門檻之企業，後續期間有較佳之營運績效改善之現象，顯示示當公司管理階層會評估其成本及效益才會透過實質盈餘管理來達成盈餘門檻。本研究實證結果亦發現應計項目之盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理對於未來績效的影響趨勢是不同的，進行實質盈餘管理企業未來績效改善期間較長。

關鍵字

實質盈餘管理 ； 應計盈餘管理 ； 未來經營績效 ； 盈餘門檻

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between real earnings management and future operating performance, and to compare the future performance implication of real earnings management with that of accrual earnings management. I hypothesize that the firms engaging in earnings management to meet earnings threshold will have better future operating performance compared to those miss the threshold, based on the belief that the investors will punish the earnings management behavior if they notice the negative earnings reversing effect. Firms can conduct earnings management by doing real transactions or using accrual adjustment. The former costs higher, and has longer-period effect compared to the latter. So based on cost-benefit effect, I hypothesize that the firms conducting real earnings management should have longer and better future performance improvement compare to those conducting accrual earnings management. This study adopts Modified Jones Model to measure the accrual-based earnings management, and Roychowdhury (2006) to measure real earnings management. The empirical results show that firms use real earnings management to meet earnings threshold have significantly better future operating performance compared to firms that miss the target. The finding also shows that firms conducting real earnings management have longer performance improvement than those doing accrual earnings management.

並列關鍵字

Real Earnings Managements ； Accrual Earnings Managements ； Future Operating Performance ； Earnings threshold.

參考文獻

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