本研究從公司治理的角度,探討管理階層與股東之間權利的關係,是否會影響可轉債持有人的轉換決策,並進一步檢測股票市場對於不同股東保障程度之公司在可轉債發行議題上之關聯性。本研究樣本為1990年到2008年美國上市公司所發行的國內可轉換公司債,我們採用Gompers et al. (2003)以及Bebchuk et al. (2009)所使用的公司治理指數,作為衡量股東權利大小的代理變數。實證結果發現,可轉債持有人的轉換決策會受到一間公司反併購條款的多寡所影響,當企業採用較少的反併購條款,可轉債持有人成為該公司股東的可能性越大。股價表現方面,反併購條款越多的公司在宣告可轉債發行後會有正面的股價遞延反應。
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the level of shareholder rights on the conversion probability of convertibles and the impact of the level of shareholder rights on the post convertibles announcement drift for the domestic convertible debts issued by the U.S. public firms over the period from 1990 through 2008. Following Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009), we adopt the Governance Index and the Entrenchment Index as proxies for the level of shareholder rights. Our findings suggest that convertible bondholders tend to convert their bonds to equities when managers adopt few anti-takeover provisions to prevent themselves from being replaced. Furthermore, we find that firms with more anti-takeover provisions have a lower conversion probability of convertibles, and are more likely to issue debt-like convertibles, which result in a positive announcement drift.