報童供應鏈利潤分享模式之研究

Profit Sharing Models for Newsvendor Problem Considering Market Demand and Product Quality Risk

廖姵婷(Pei-Ting Liao)

指導教授 ： 徐旭昇

元智大學/工程學院/工業工程與管理學系/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6838/YZU.2012.00184

摘要

過去的報童供應鏈利潤分享與利潤最大化問題研究中很少同時考慮市場風險與品質風險，市場風險為需求不確定性造成供應鏈產品製造過剩或短缺，兩種情況都會造成不必要的成本;而品質風險則是顧客收到不良品時造成的損失。本研究同時考慮供應鏈之市場風險與品質風險，研究提出兩個供應鏈模式:第一為議價模式由下游零售商承擔市場風險，決定產品訂購量與市場價格，由供應商開出批發價，但零售商可以訂購量來與供應商協議，供應商由零售商所決定之訂購量來找到最佳利潤，便以最佳利潤時的批發價將產品賣給零售商;第二為抽成模式由供應商同時承擔市場風險與品質風險，決定產品生產量與市場價格，零售商僅扮演銷售的角色，利潤來自總利潤的抽成，供應商的訂價策略將影響雙方是否皆能獲得更多利益。在兩模式中皆由供應商承擔品質風險，供應商將以選別型檢驗計劃來降低品質風險，故須付出產品檢驗成本，研究建立計量型與計數型檢驗計劃，並比較其成本。供應鏈模式假設市場需求服從韋布分配，依照市場價格影響韋布分配參數之情況，市場需求分配可分為兩種:(1)僅比例參數受市場價格影響之韋布分配、(2)比例參數與形狀參數皆受市場價格影響之韋布分配。綜合市場風險成本與品質風險成本，研究將對議價模式與抽成模式進行比較，探討供應鏈成員如何分享利潤以及在什麼條件下可達到雙贏的局面。而數據分析結果顯示在相同市場價格下，以議價模式之最佳利潤為基準，不論市場需求分配為何，抽成模式之市場價格在某個範圍內可使供應商與零售商獲益提升。

關鍵字

報童供應鏈 ； 利潤分享 ； 韋布分配 ； 計量型檢驗計劃 ； 貝氏方法

並列摘要

This research studies channel coordination through profit sharing contracts for a newsvendor supply chain model that considers both market demand uncertainty and product quality risk. We investigate two distinct types of arrangements between a retailer and his supplier. One arrangement is a wholesale-price driven contract and the other is a sales-agent contract. It is assumed that both parties share the same information on market demand distribution, salvage value per unsold unit, shortage cost per unit, and product cost per unit. Furthermore, it is assumed that the market demand is Weibull distributed, and the market price will influence the scale and shape parameters of the distribution. The first arrangement is a game-theoretic model, where the supplier offers a wholesale price to the retailer, and the retailer will then determine the market price and order quantity based on maximizing his own profit. On the other hand, the supplier will bear the product quality cost, and his profit will be the total sales revenue deducted by the production cost and product quality cost. In this arrangement, the supplier will select the wholesale price that maximizes his profit, and the retailer will determine the market price and the order quantity that optimize his profit with the given wholesale price.

In the second arrangement, the supplier manages the supply chain business decisions, which include the market price, production quantity, and product inspection sampling plan. The objective is to maximize the total profit of the supply chain. The retailer serves as a sales agent, and will receive the commission amounting to at least what he should earn in the first arrangement. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the two arrangements, as well as a discussion of how to negotiate win-win conditions. Finally, sensitivity analyses of the problem parameters are provided.

並列關鍵字

Bayesian approach ； supply chain management ； Newsvendor problems ； channel coordination ； profit sharing ； rectifying inspection sampling plans

參考文獻

29.林聖芬 (2011) ，「供應鏈廠商考量市場與品質風險下利潤最大化與利潤分享問題之研究」，元智大學工業工程管理研究所碩士論文。

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