政府租稅優惠或定額補貼：寡占市場下的開發商投資決策分析

Government policy and the developer’s investment decision in the oligopoly market.

郭宏倫(Hung-Lun Kuo)

指導教授 ： 姜一銘

元智大學/管理學院/商學碩士班(財務金融學程)/碩士(2012年)

摘要

由於房地產與其它金融資產的特性有所不同，其價值會隨著本身的區位、品質、流動性與市場需求而有所不同，這種特性使得實質資產與一般標準化的金融商品有所差異，也使得房地產市場往往會受到許多干擾，使得真實價值難以明確估算。在這種情況下，開發商若想要開發某塊地區時，往往會難以衡量開發案的潛在價值並且提高開發的成本。因此，當政府想要開發某塊地區時(如偏遠地區的開發、離島建設或公共基礎設施的興建等)，必須做出誘因政策給予一開始最先投資的開發商在租稅上的優惠或是實質上的補貼，降低開發商的進入投資門檻，進而達到政府開發政策。開發商在做一項投資案的決策時，由於投資案的價值具有高度不確定性以及不可回復性，因此開發商可以等待在未來更好的時間點作才投資，換句話說，開發商擁有一個等待選擇權，也因不同於一般金融商品的選擇權，而特稱為實質選擇權。
本文利用實質選擇權的分析方法，並考慮市場為寡占市場模型為架構下(市場只有兩家競爭開發商)，其中先進入投資的開發商為領導開發商，後進者為跟隨開發商，並分析開發商的投資進入門檻、投資賽局策略以及競爭效果。並假設兩種情況(1)市場沒有其他干擾因素，且實質資產的真實價值可以觀察得到。(2)市場中存在干擾且實質資產價值會受到干擾項的影響。進而分析政府給予誘因機制時在不同市場假設下的差異性，並比較政府在不同的誘因政策下(租稅減免或定額補貼)的差異性，並提出政策建議。

關鍵字

實質選擇權 ； 寡占市場競爭賽局 ； 政府定額補貼或課稅優惠 ； 市場干擾

並列摘要

Compare to the financial asset market, the real estate market has quite different characteristic. The value of the real estate is various according to the real estate’s location, quality, liquidity, or the market demand, and can cause noise into the valuation of the real estate. The result leads to the developer estimated the development project difficultly and increase the potential investment cost. For this reason, when government aim to develop an area, specific industry or build infrastructure, the government has to take some incentive policy that reduce the developer’s investment threshold and achieve the government’s target further.
This thesis adopts the real option approach, and assumed the market is oligopoly(the market has two competitors only), the developer which entry into the market first as the leader and the developer which chooses to wait and see as the follower. And we assume the government will give investment benefit to the leader only.
This paper aims to analysis the developer’s threshold value and competitive strategy between the difference policies (Lump-Sum subsidies and Credits-Tax) and difference market conditions (Market has noise or not). Finally, we compare the developer’s investment decision between the different market situation and what the incentive policy be used.

並列關鍵字

Market noise. ； Real option ； Lump-Sum subsidies ； Credits-Tax ； Competitive strategies ； Game theory

參考文獻

Executive Yuan of R.O.C,1990,( Statute for Upgrading Industries)

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