Moehrle(2002)的研究認為,許多公司的管理階層都會為了:1.符合或超過分析師預期,2.避免盈餘降低,3.避免損失發生,而藉由重整行為所產生的重整費用來管理盈餘。故本研究欲針對公司重整是否會對其盈餘品質造成影響作一研究。 雖然Healy(1985)告訴我們盈餘對於公司評價是有用處的,但由於公司管理階層和外部財務報表使用者之間存在著資訊不對稱的關係,因此財務報表上的盈餘表達是真實的、亦或是人為操弄的,我們無從得知。故引起本研究之動機,即對公司盈餘品質之衡量。 Francis et al.(2005)藉由Dichow and Dichev(2002)的研究,成功的將裁決性應計品質求算出來,故本研究運用Francis et al.(2005)的實證方法,針對西元1993-2000年美國的重整公司作一探討,藉由其盈餘品質來檢驗公司管理階層是否有操弄盈餘的現象。 本研究的實證結果發現,裁決性應計項目品質確實可以將重整公司和無重整公司作一明確的區隔,也就是說重整公司的盈餘品質較差、管理階層操弄盈餘的程度較無重整公司來的大。
Moehrle(2002) regards restructuring charge reversals are associated with incentives to meet or exceed analysts’ forecasts, avoid earnings declines relative to prior-year levels, and avoid losses. In this study, I investigate whether the quality of earnings of those firms that have reported restructuring charges is low since restructurings can be related to earnings manipulations. Although Healy(1985) consider the earnings is useful to evaluate a company. However, due to information asymmetry between managers and external financial statement users who rely on financial statement information to make investment and credit decisions, earnings quality is at the heart of financial reporting. Based on Francis et al.(2005), I distinguish between accruals quality driven by economic fundamentals (innate AQ) versus management choices(discretionary AQ) and measure earnings quality of restructuring firms versus non-restructuring firms with discretionary AQ. The empirical results indicates that there is a significant difference in discretionary AQ between restructuring and non-restructuring firms.. In another word, restructuring firm has poorer earnings quality and the higher degree of discretionary management choice.