本研究以高階管理者的離職為構面,探討台灣上市、櫃銀行業控制股東股權結構與董事會結構對高階管理者職機率之影響,並進一步驗證外部治理效力對控制股東超額控制權與高階管理者離職率間負向關係之抑制效果。實證結果發現,在我國銀行業裡,公司績效和高階管理者的離職機率間呈不顯著負相關。若進一步區分總經理與控制股東關係則發現,當高階管理者為控制股東法人代表時,績效的好壞並不影響到高階管理者的地位;反之,高階管理者若非控制股東法人代表,則公司績效的好壞會顯著的影響到總經理的去留。我們並發現董事會結構與控制股東股權結構對淘汰不適任高階管理者之內部治理效力的影響,僅在高階管理者非以控制股東法人代表身分擔任董事時,方見顯著效果。當高階管理者非控制股東代表法人時,控制股東所有權愈高,愈容易汰換績效不佳之高階管理者,而超額控制權與內部董事比愈高,亦確實對公司治理之監督機制有不利影響,即愈不會撤換不適任管理者,至於外部治理機制無論高階管理者與控制股東關係為何,對高階管理者之監督效果均不佳。 關鍵字:高階管理者離職、公司治理、董事會組成
This study discusses whether the composition of the board and the ownership structure affect top executive turnover: an empirical evidence of listed and OTC banks in Taiwan is used to test the impact of the interaction of external corporate governance and control on top executive turnover. The evidence indicates that firm performance has weaken negative impact on the probability of turnover in financial industry. Hence, the study distinguishes the types of top executives into insider and outsider aspects. When the top executives are insiders, poor firm performance doesn’t affect the top executive turnover. In other words, if the top executives are outsiders, firm performance has significantly negative impact over the top executive turnover. The paper also discovers that internal corporate governance has significantly impact on the top executive who is an outsider. The higher rank of top executives who are not controlling stockholders but with power over stockholders, the more chance to maneuver their firms effectively. Furthermore, the more inside board directors with exceeding power obtain adverse effect to eliminate unfit top executives, which implies that the poor corporate governance occurs. As to the external corporate governance, the top executive efficiency over their firms has nothing to do with their relationship with controlling stockholders. Key:Top Executives Turnover, Corporate Governance, Board Structure