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  • 學位論文

資通訊產業標準必要專利FRAND授權義務相關法律問題之研討

Legal Issues Surrounding FRAND Lisensing of Standard Essential Patents in ICT

指導教授 : 劉孔中 彭心儀

摘要


在資通訊產業標準制定活動盛行、專利數量繁星化的背景下,應如何處理標準與必要專利間衝突下所產生之「專利箝制」與「權利金堆疊」現象,實為各標準制定組織在推行標準上首要解決的問題。目前,多透過專利政策中的「揭露標準必要專利義務」、「FRAND授權義務」試圖平衡專利權人及標準實施者之關係,然雖其立意良善,但仍有義務內涵不清、規範不足等爭議。而這些爭議在標準制定組織未有效處理的限制下,近期紛紛湧入各國行政、司法機關。觀察此些具體個案,可發現爭議多環繞在:一、專利權人向標準制定組織所為FRAND承諾法律性質為何?二、FRAND合理權利金應如何計算?三、FRAND承諾是否限制專利權人行使專利排他請求權?基此,本文考量環繞在標準必要專利上之訴訟於全球發生,參考美國、歐盟、日本與中國法院之判決意見,檢討上述爭議若在我國發生法律上可能之操作,以提供將來於我國發生之標準必要專利訴訟可資參考的意見。結論上,本文以為應將FRAND承諾定性為「第三人利益契約」,並透過「比較法」搭配總價法計算FRAND權利金,而在FRAND承諾是否限制專利權人行使專利排他請求權之議題上,則應採「有限制核發禁制令」之見解,以調節專利權人與標準實施者間之利益衝突。

並列摘要


Given that both standard setting takes place often and patents proliferate in the information and communication technology (“ICT”) sector, how to deal with the tension between standard implementers and standard-essential patent (“SEP”) holders and the issues of patent-holdup and royalty stacking becomes top priority for standard setting organizations (“SSOs”) . To manage this tension, SSOs have generally adopted patent policies requiring their members to disclose SEPs and commit to license their SEPs on a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) license. However, the content of FRAND remains ambiguous and necessary regulation is lacking, a growing amount of litigation is flooding many jurisdictions. The key issues of these litigation mostly focus on three areas: first, the appropriate legal basis for standard implementers to claim a FRAND rate against SEP holders; second, the methods for calculating reasonable royalties; and third, the rules for granting injunctions. As litigation concerning SEPs and FRAND spread globally, we must pay greater attention to the laws and approaches adopted by the US, European Union, Japan, and People's Republic of China. Accordingly, this thesis discusses issues that might arise in Taiwan based on comparative study. In essence, this thesis argues that FRAND commitment is a third-party beneficiary contract; the method for calculating reasonable royalties is comparable benchmarking; and injunction should be granted only when the standard implementer refuses to accept a FRAND license.

參考文獻


 邱聰智 (2003),《新訂民債篇通則(下)》。台北:輔仁大學法學叢書編輯委員會。
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 公平交易委員會對於公平交易法第二十五條案件之處理原則。
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