摘要
依據啟蒙運動的理性傳統，一個人之所以持有某個信念，乃是基於主體之 理性運作的結果，它強調人的心理受到一種很特殊的、來自理性的規範所約 束。但這樣的想法，從19世紀中期開始受到系譜學的批評，系譜學家們主張， 我們的理由背後其實都是受到外部偶然因素的影響，例如馬克思主張，這些偶 然因素就是他所處的經濟階級；尼采則主張，一個人的行動、思想則是他的權 力意志的表現；佛洛伊德宣稱，一個人對於自己兒時在家庭關係之角色中，對 於一個人的人格發展存在著無法抹滅的反響。本文將從勞勃．布蘭登的〈理 由、系譜學以及大器的詮釋學〉一文去探討：他如何從當代理性主義的角度去 批評系譜學家的立場，他指出，系譜學家主張將理性消解掉時，其主張同時也 會使信念失去內容。本文並且評估布蘭登對系譜學家所提出的批評。 依據布蘭登之分析，系譜學家的主張存在語意上的缺陷。原因在於，一個 信念如果要具有內容，我們必須要訴諸主體心理狀態之間的理性關聯，而當系 譜學家消解了理性，他們其實也會使信念失去內容。若系譜學家要避免信念失 去內容，他們必須預設一套康德式的二階段概念觀。然而布蘭登主張二階段概 念觀存在兩個有問題的預設，所以二階段概念觀無法為真。因此，系譜學家的 主張最後導致了自我毀滅的後果，他們原本想以外部之偶然因素來解釋信念的 形成，但他們的主張卻使自己要解釋的東西無法被算做是信念。 本文聚焦在兩點問題上：首先，筆者將評估二階段概念觀是否真的存在內 部問題。此外，筆者亦將探討，我們是否需要接受「我們必須訴諸理性關聯， 才能使信念具有內容」之主張，系譜學家是否可能預設自然主義式的概念觀？ 如果是這樣的話，那他們又會遇到什麼樣的批評？最後，本文接受布蘭登對於 二階段概念觀的批評，二階段概念觀在規範效力上，無法使主體受到任何約 束；此外，本文亦同意，由於自然主義概念觀對於「概念使用」的說法存在問 題，以及它無法固定概念內容，所以系譜學家沒有理由接受之。綜上所述，本 文主張，布蘭登對於系譜學家的批評是成功的。
並列摘要
Enlightenment tells us that one’s holding a belief is a result based on his/her rationality’s process. It emphasizes that human mind is being constrained by a special, rational kind of norms. But this thought was challenged by genealogy since mid19th century. Genealogists hold that our holding a belief is simply because we are influenced by mere contingent factors. For Nietzsche, they are our expressions of the Will to Power. For Marx, the contingent factors are his/her economic class. For Freud, it is the role he played in family relations in childhood that affect his characteristic development. Based on Robert Brandom’s article Reason, Genealogy, and Hermeneutics of Magnanimity, this article discusses how he, from a contemporary rationalist’s view, criticizes that while genealogists’ claim to eliminate rationality, they also make beliefs contentless. This article eventually evaluates Brandom’s semantic criticism of genealogists. According to Brandom’s analysis, there are semantic flaws in genealogists’ claim. That is, for a belief to have content, we have to resort to the rational relations of the subject’s mental states. But if genealogists reduce rationality to natural world, they also make beliefs contentless. To reconcile this tension, Brandom claims that genealogists have to assume a Kantian two-stage theory. However, he argues that the two-stage theory can’t resolve the tension genealogists face, so their claim can’t stand its ground in the end. This article focus on two issues in Brandom’s argument: First, I investigate whether there are really some problems in two-stage theory. Second, to evaluating whether we should accept the assumption of “For a belief to have content, we have to resort to the rational relations of the subject’s mental states.” I try to establish the possibility of genealogists accepting naturalistic theory of concept and consider Brandom’s rejections of that theory. At last, I accept Brandom’s criticism of genealogists on normative force, two-stage theory can’t explain how a subject is being constrained. I also accept that the account of naturalistic theory of concept for concept using is problematic, and the theory can’t fix conceptual contents. So, genealogists have no reason to accept it. Above all, this article claims that Brandom’s semantic criticism of genealogists is successful.
並列關鍵字
Brandom ； genealogy ； rationalism ； naturalism ； empiricism ； concept ； semantic ； normativity參考文獻
延伸閱讀
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