- 學位論文
由效率違約理論論WTO報復制度下同等性之問題
A Review of Equivalence Requirement under WTO Retaliation : Efficient Breach Perspeetive
摘要
報復制度作為WTO救濟機制的最後一道防線，其規定如何，是否能有效促使會員國遵守WTO義務，關乎救濟制度之成敗。遺憾的是，經由過去幾年的實踐與發展，報復制度遭受許多的批評與要求改進的聲浪，最主要的批評在於仲裁人就授權WTO會員國進行報復之程度，過去的實踐看來似乎無法有效促使違反WTO義務之會員國立即改正其違法行為，且權利被侵害之國家基於政治經濟之現實考量往往欠缺實際實施報復之能力；然而另一方面，會員國亦有認為仲裁人在認定上過於恣意寬鬆之批評。 對於迥然不同之批評，本文試圖以國際法以外之角度切入分析，以經濟分析及契約法上效率違約理論(efficient breach theory)的角度觀察WTO的爭端解決機制，以效率的觀點觀察目前制度上是否符合經濟學上效率之要求，作為解釋現行制度優劣之依據。效率違約理論的論點主要認為一個制度應該要能夠促進社會最大的效益，如果在適當的賠償後違約是較有經濟效率之選擇，則法律制度應支持當事人違約，避免過度的賠償損害經濟效率，WTO之爭端解決機制是否有助於促進國際貿易之效率，本文認為應是判斷報復制度過輕或過重之重要指標。 本文之研究方法係以WTO爭端解決機制之規範、學者之論述以及目前WTO爭端解決機制目前九個授權報復仲裁案之實踐作為研究之方向，觀察仲裁人在決定會員國實施報復之程度上判斷之方式，並試圖分析目前之實踐是否符合經濟效率之要求。 依據研究之初步結果，本文認為現行WTO爭端解決機制事實上符合效率違約理論之精神，報復之程度以利益受剝奪或減損之會員國所受損害之程度為限，避免過重之制裁，對於授權報復金額上之程度，大抵恪守同等性或適當性之要求與限制，然而在認定方法之選擇上，則仍不免有過於恣意之傾向。另一方面，由於效率之認定仍需更精確地分析當事人利益變動之狀況，此亦有待後續研究者提出更深入之分析。
並列摘要
The suspension of concession or other obligation, a.k.a. retaliation, is the last resort of remedy available under WTO, and defines the overall achievement of WTO dispute resolution mechanism. Unfortunately, the practice over the last decade drew much criticisms and requests of improvements. One of the major issues is that the retaliation under WTO is not serious enough to encourage WTO Members acting in accordance with the WTO treaty obligations and DSB recommendations. Moreover, the Member states suffering from nullification or impairment caused by illegal acts are usually not possessing with the ability to put the retaliatory measure into practice. To the contrary, some Member states criticize the arbitrators for being arbitrary in their decision of retaliation cases. Among the different criticisms, this article tries to examine and analyze in the approaches other than International Trade Law regime itself. This article tries to apply the efficient breach theory to see if the retaliation mechanism meets the economic efficiency. The gist of efficient breach theory is that a legal system should induce maximum welfare of the society. If breach is an economic efficient choice, the legal system should allow the party to breach his obligation without paying punitive penalty, and the premium could therefore being generated. This article claims that the economic efficiency should be an important criterion in judging the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. This article reflects the studies of the current WTO dispute resolution mechanism, opinions of the WTO law scholars, and the actual practice of the DSB in several DSU 22.6 arbitration cases. Based on the studies, this article tries to explain whether the approaches applied by the arbitrators consist with the requirement of economic efficiency. The preliminary result of the studies shows that the WTO dispute resolution mechanism is consistent with the efficient breach theory. The remedy available under WTO prevents a sanction with punitive nature by restricting the principle of equivalency and appropriateness. However, the model chosen by the arbitrators to determine the level of retaliation somehow shows a tendency of arbitrariness. This article also wishes to induce more input on the studies the economic analysis of the WTO system.