利用二階規劃探討回收體系價格策略之研究 －以台灣廢塑膠容器為例

Pricing Strategies for Recycling System by Using Bi-level Programming：an Application of Disposed Plastic Container in Taiwan.

林聖鈞(Lin, Sheng Chun)

指導教授 ： 溫于平

國立清華大學/工學院/工業工程與工程管理學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

近年來，由於科技日新月異電子產品不斷的推陳出新，大量汰換的廢棄電子產品造成的環境衝擊，使得各國政府不得不重視資源再生利用的問題，台灣政府也積極建立環保法規，鼓勵消費者購買再製商品，以及提倡企業建立綠色設計、生產與再製造。
在傳統的資源再生供應鏈中，主要由政府、回收商、製造商三方所構成，過去的研究，政府面著重於發放補貼金和行政經費的運用，回收商則著重於回收率的提高和利潤最大化，製造商則以供應鏈的協同與營收最大化為主要探討，也有部分研究探討其中兩者間之相互關係的影響。然而消費者將廢棄物品回收及購買再製品之行為，也牽涉到回收商之營運及製造商購買再製原料之意願，消費者進行回收可領取回收獎勵金，而回收獎勵金的高低也直接影響消費者之回收行為，但是對於回收商而言回收獎勵金的支出，雖然提供了廢棄物品的來源，但也造成回收成本的提高。
故本研究將消費者的角色納入此再生供應鏈中，並加入其他製造商的搶貨競爭，探討主製造商願意購買二次原料的購入價，以及回收商提供消費者廢棄物品回收之回收獎勵金的高低，和回收商在主製造商與其他製造商願付價格不同的最佳配貨量，達到主製造商與回收商雙方的最佳獲益，並將政府設定成一個輔助的角色，進行管控協調主製造商與回收商雙方之金流補貼的中間者，以此建構二階數學模式。
二階層數學規劃模式能用於探討兩個不同決策層級的決策問題，因此本研究設定高階為主製造商，為提升研究之可行性，故先以主製造商的角度為出發點，目標為調整二次原料購入價的高低，以達最高獲益；低階則為回收商，目標則是追求回收利潤之最大化。本研究將以塑膠容器PP與PE之實務例子作為研究樣本進行分析，其研究結果將可實際提供回收及再製造業者，有效執行綠色生產及資源再利用的決策建議與參考。

關鍵字

二階層規劃 ； 有效解 ； 塑膠容器資源回收 ； 協同合作

並列摘要

In recent years, technology starts to make advance in new electronic products. But, large amounts of electronic waste have an impact on environment gradually which leads to many countries begin to emphasize on reuse of resources. On the other hand, Taiwan government also actively establishes environmental regulations to encourage consumers buying remanufactured goods and promote enterprises to build up the green design, green production and remanufacture.
In the traditional supply chain of renewable resources, it consists of the government, recyclers and manufacturers. In previous research, the government focuses on the payment of subsidies and administrative costs, recyclers are focused on the improvement of recovery rate and maximize the benefits, manufacturers pay an attention to the supply chain’s collaboration and its own profits as a key point. Some studies investigate the relationship between them. However, recycling and purchasing recycled products by consumers are also involved that directly affects manufactures’ will of buying secondary materials products and benefit of recyclers. Consumers receive recycling incentives for recycling, which directly affect the level of consumers’ recycling behavior. The spending of recycling incentives provides the source of waste materials, while causes a higher cost.
In this study, we consider that consumers in the supply chain and the competition of other manufacturers are included to explore the main manufacturers’ will to buy the secondary materials, as well as that the price recyclers are willing to provide to consumers of the recycled waste materials, then recyclers will decide selling the resources to main manufactures or to other manufacturers to reach better benefits. Furthermore, the government plays a role of supporting and coordination the manufacturer and recycler by subsidies.
In order to find the optimal decision, this study constructs a bi-level programming (BLP) model. The hierarchical and interactive nature between the two parties can be formulated by BLP to investigate two different levels of decision-making problems. In this study, we set the manufacturer as the higher-level decision maker and the recyclers as the lower-level decision maker. Higher-level decision maker adjusts the price of secondary material to achieve maximum benefit. On the other hand, lower-level decision maker maximizes profits through changing the secondary materials sold volume and the price of recycling incentives. In addition, this research will use PP and PE plastic containers as numerical examples in the practice to illustrate how recyclers and re-manufacturers to implement of green production and resource recycling effectively.

並列關鍵字

Bi-level programming ； Efficient solution ； Plastic recycling industry ； Collaboration

參考文獻

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