管理者薪酬與公司風險承擔之關係- 美國上市公司之實證

CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk Taking- Evidence from US Listed-Firms

劉鎮順(Tien-Thuan Luu)

指導教授 ： 俞海琴

中原大學/商學院/商學博士學位學程/博士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201200014

摘要

這篇文章採用聯立方程探討CEO補償和屬性之間是否會導致公司冒險，其中CEO補償及冒險是屬於內生性。我們使用3SLS解釋聨立方程式 (SEMs)，結果發現在美國上市公司不同的CEO補償結構會引起不同的冒險。補償契約可以用於緩和代理問題以鼓勵冒險行為，像是股票補償與整體補償會促進冒險。無論如何，補償沒有激勵作用時，對冒險具有負向的衝擊像是現金補償，在SEMs中，這個結果藉由總補償的現金比率也被支撐，並且顯示大量現金總補償率的CEO或者是大量負債持有的適當投資和財務策略具有較怟的風險，再者，我們的結果也表示補償與CEO屬性之間的因果關係所導致的冒險。CEO的自負對冒險具有顯著的影響如同補償是一樣的。我們採用盈餘波動度變數，進行穩定檢定測試補償與CEO屬性之間的因果關係所導致的風險，結果是相同的並且支持最初的發現。這些發現增加了一些CEO屬性構面(例如，自負、年齡、經歷與地位)及提供補償組合在研究補償範疇和冒險的文章上。當管理者與投資者在不同的市場要設計補償契約與實施補充程序時，文章也對於管理者與投資者的決策也提供了額外的貢獻。

關鍵字

風險 ； 管理者薪酬

並列摘要

This paper studies whether the causal relationship between the Chief of Executive Officer’s (CEO) compensation and his attributes induces corporate risk taking by using simultaneous equations models (SEMs), in which both executive compensation and risk taking are endogenous. By using a Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) method to solve the SEMs, results show that different CEO compensation structures induce different risk taking in the U.S. listed-firms. The compensation contract may be used to mitigate agency problems by encouraging risk taking behavior as both equity-based compensation and total compensation promote risk taking. Compensation without any incentive like cash compensation, however, has an inverse impact on it. This finding is also supported by using a cash to total compensation ratio in SEMs and shows that CEOs with large cash to total compensation ratio or large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky. Furthermore, our results report that the causal relationship between compensation and CEO attributes induces risk taking. Overconfident attributes have a significant impact on risk taking and compensation as well. To support the initial findings, the study performs the robustness test to examine the causal relationship between the executive compensation and CEO attributes on risk measured by earnings volatility shows similar results. These findings add some dimensions CEO attributes (e.g., overconfidence, age, experience and dominance) and components of compensation on research literature in the field of compensation and risk taking. They also provide additional contribution for managers/investors on decision making when they begin to design compensation contracts and perform the recruitment process in different market situations.

並列關鍵字

Risk taking ； Compensation structure ； CEO attributes ； Black-Scholes volatility

參考文獻

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