員工分紅入股與員工認股選擇權對公司績效與投資支出影響性研究

The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Employee Stock Option on the Performance and Capital Investment Expenditure of the Corporations

溫燕翔(Yen-Hsiang Wen)

指導教授 ： 胡為善

中原大學/商學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200400445

摘要

中文摘要
雖然國內高科技業及其他產業實行員工分紅入股已有很長遠之歷史，但近來亦引發了諸多爭論，近三年來隨著選擇權市場的建立，員工認股選擇權的獎勵成為企業主要制度之一。根據過去外國經驗顯示，員工認股選擇權有助於企業提升經營績效，但在台灣，迄今並無足夠證據顯示員工認股權有助於台灣的各個企業。
本研究主要目的在探討員工分紅入股制度、員工認股選權制度與雙軌制(分紅入股與認股選擇權併行)對企業的績效與投資支出之影響。以實行員工分紅入股與員工認股選擇權之上市電子公司為樣本，研究期間自民國90至92年，研究方法以橫斷面與時間序列合併的資料模型(Panel Data)進行研究，其結果如下：
在企業績效方面，不論是實行員工分紅入股、員工認股選擇權與雙軌制，對於績效方面皆無顯著影響，顯現出分紅入股制度對企業績效並無顯著幫助，而認股選擇權制度則因在起步階段，且尚未大量實行，因此員工認股選擇權對績效方面並未產生顯著影響。
在投資支出方面，無論何種制度的實行對於投資支出並無直接顯著關聯，主要源因在於分紅入股制度的主要來源為庫藏股，因此庫藏股可能為主要影響投資支出關係。但認股選擇權雖多以新股方式發行，但因履約日期尚未到達，對於企業資金並無增加，對於投資支出因而並無顯著關聯。

關鍵字：員工分紅入股、員工認股選擇權、企業績效

關鍵字

員工分紅入股 ； 企業績效 ； 員工認股選擇權

並列摘要

Abstract
The employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) has implemented for a long time in Taiwan, it also causes many controversial issues. During the past three years, as the option market has been established, the employee stock option (ESO) becomes one of the major compensation systems in Taiwan. According to previous literatures, ESO is benefitial for the performance of the corporations. Nevertheless, there has not been adequate evidence to demonstrate the ESO is helpful for Taiwanese to corporations.

This study investigates the relationship among employee stock ownership, employee stock option, corporate performance, and investment expenditure. This work empirically examines the effects of stock ownership and stock option announcements for companies listed in the TSE. Panel data is used and the sample period is from January 2001 to December 2003. The empirical results are summarized as follows：

Both of the ESOP and ESO do not significantly affect the firm’s performance. Since ESO has just been started two years ago and is not popular at this moment, ESO does not significantly affect corporate performance.

Empirical results indicate that corporate investment expenditure is not affected by the implement of ESOP and ESO. The possible explanation is that the corporations which exercise ESOP by repurchasing it’s own stock so that repurchased stocks become major factor to affect corporate investment expenditure. Although ESO is matched with the new common stocks, yet the exercising date has not come right now, the ESO does not affect corporate investment expenditure so far.

Keywords：ESOP、ESO、Corporate performance、Panel Data

並列關鍵字

ESOP ； ESO ； Corporate performance ； Panel Data

參考文獻

莊澄祥，(2003)，庫藏股與公司股價、員工分紅配股及投資支出關聯性之研究-以台灣上市公司為例，中原大學企業管理所碩士論文

Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., “Stock Option Plans for Non-executive Employees”, Journal of Financial Economics. Amsterdam: Aug 2001. Vol. 61, Iss. 2; p. 253

Gillian, H. H., Yeo, S., Chen, K. W., Ho, C. L.,. “Effects of Executive Share Option Plans on Shareholder Wealth and Firm Performance: The Singapore evidence”, The Financial Review. Tallahassee: May 1999. Vol. 34, Iss. 2; p. 1-19

Hausman, J.A.,“Specification Tests in Econometrics,” Econometrica, Vol.46, 1978, p.1251-1271.

Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., Palia, D. “Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link between Ownership and Performance” Journal of Financial Economics. Amsterdam: Sep 1999. Vol. 53, Iss. 3; p. 353-384