從財務預測精準度探討我國財務預測制度

From the Accuracy of Earning Forecasts to Investigate the Forecast System

馮曉玉(Shauo-Yu Feng)

指導教授 ： 張櫻馨 ； 張櫻馨

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200500283

摘要

主管機關為降低公司與投資人間的資訊不對稱，於民國78年起要求部分上市(櫃)公司須發佈財務預測，此項制度歷經多年修改，實施至今爭議不斷，爭議的問題多偏向虛報財務預測數字或藉由財務預測的發佈炒作股價等議題，因此，主管機關在廣泛聽取各方意見後，認為強制性財務預測資訊已不能成為有用的資訊，於是決定廢除強制公開財務預測制度，改採自願公開財務預測制度，但以美國經驗來說，在自願公開財務預測制度下，經營管理者很有可能為避免預測誤差過大所帶來的訴訟風險，因而選擇不發佈或僅對少數特定人(如：證券分析師等)發佈財務預測資訊，如此一來，不但無法降低公司與投資人(除證券分析師等特定人士外)間的資訊不對稱，更加深投資人與投資人(如：散戶與證券分析師間)間的資訊不對稱。
上述問題不但與改採自願公開財務預測制度有關，更與證券分析師財務預測有著密不可分的關係，所以本研究不只針對自願性財務預測品質探討，也將證券分析師財務預測品質納入研究對象。實證結果顯示強制性財務預測精準度高於自願性財務預測精準度，但證券分析師財務預測精準度卻高於自願性財務預測精準度，此結果更引發本研究想要深入探討精準度不同的原因，最後綜合研究結果發掘過去財務預測制度的缺失與未來可能衍生的問題，並提出幾點建議供主管機關未來修改制度的參考。

關鍵字

證券分析師財務預測 ； 自願性財務預測 ； 強制性財務預測

並列摘要

The regulator required a part of listed companies to announce earnings forecasts in 1989 in order to reduce information asymmetric between companies and investors. This system was revised many times but it was disputed continuously. The questions focused on making untrue earnings forecasts or manipulate stock prices etc. Consequently, after hearing the opinions extensively, the regulator thought that mandatory earnings forecasts haven’t been useful information. It decided to abolish the mandatory earnings forecasts system, and indroducing the voluntary earnings forecasts. According to America experience, under the voluntary earnings forecasts system, managers probably choose not to announce the forecasts or only announce the forecasts to analysts. This will not reduce information asymmetric not only between companies and investors but also between investors and investors.
As stated above, this paper studies not only the quality of the voluntary earnings forecasts but also the quality of the analysts’ earnings forecasts. The empirical results show that mandatory earnings forecasts is more accurate than voluntary earnings forecasts, but analysts’ earnings forecasts is more accurate than voluntary earnings forecasts. This paper investigated why the different accuracy yield, and provide several recommends for regulator.

並列關鍵字

mandatory earnings forecasts ； analysts’ earnings forecasts ； voluntary earnings forecasts

參考文獻

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