- 學位論文
從司法實務實證結果反思內線交易行政管制的重要性—以勁永公司禿鷹案為例
A Reflection of Judicial Enforcement on the Insider Trading Regulations – Focusing on the Jing-Yong Insider Trading Case
摘要
我國證券交易法至民國七十七年一月二十九日始增訂第一百五十七條之ㄧ明文禁止內線交易，觀立法沿革可知構成要件與重刑化是歷次修法重點與趨勢，然而台灣內線交易罰責日漸加重，卻不見內線交易因而沉寂，而瑞士洛桑管理學院在二○○六年五月發布的「世界競爭力報告」中，台灣競爭力從二○○五年的十一名退步到十八名，二○○六年更有登上國際版面的總統女婿趙建銘的台開內線交易案，亦顯見政府對於打擊內線交易，單靠提高刑責與修正構成要件是無法杜絕此類交易。我國近來有關內線交易的實務判決中均有引用美國內線交易的理論，因此本文第二章從美國內線交易理論發展史來看內線交易責任理論變遷的過程與爭議作為我國法治的借鏡，而實證我國司法實務判決亦可發現在內線交易構成要件上存有理論適用與不確定法律概念解釋等問題。本文第三章以勁永公司禿鷹案為例，禿鷹集團執行內線交易的佈局過程突顯出僅以刑事介入不僅未能嚇阻犯罪，甚且成為犯罪的工具，更是突顯出刑事規範為處理重心實已偏離證券交易法為市場法之本質，所以應思考將內線交易的管制重點移至行政監理方面。 至於在行政管制層面上，本文第四章從證券市場的發展、人頭戶防制、資訊揭露制度等面向切入，分析行政權在內線交易防制觀念上應有的作為，內線交易因本質上是一個投資行為，相對於證券主管機關就有一定的行政目的，那就是「吸引投資」，為使證券市場交易量能擴增，讓證券市場中的參與者與相關單位都能獲利，但同時又認內線交易是涉及不公平交易的不法行為，本文以為不宜逕動用刑事手段，而宜先行透過行政管制方式，提高內線交易行為人的投資成本，讓市場機制自動令其退出證券市場而不影響其他投資人的權益。證券市場本身必須建立起完善的防制內線交易秩序觀念即第一道防線是證券機構與投資人的自律，第二道防線是行政權的管制層面，最後一道才是司法偵查與審判。因此，證券主管機關在證券集中交易市場應即刻建立起積極與完善的內線交易行政管理制度，即以行政管制與市場機制方式先將內線交易不法行為衝擊證券市場的影響程度降至最低，令「未獲利的內線交易行為」與「該內線未實際衝擊股價的內線交易行為」退出市場後，再對其他真正嚴重侵蝕證券市場與投資人的內線交易行為移送司法偵辦，受到罪刑相當的有罪判決，才能使我國證券交易法第一百五十七條之ㄧ內線交易刑事條文體現出其實益與價值。
並列摘要
The punishment of insider trading has been continuously raised in Taiwan; however, the insider trading has not been eliminated accordingly. In the 2006 World Competitiveness Yearbook issued on May by the International Institute of Management Development (IMD) of Switzerland, Taiwan’s overall competitiveness ranks 18th, falling from the 11th position ranked in the previous year. This indicates that the government could not prohibit insider trading by only amending the constitutive requirements and raising the punishments. The adjudication of recent insider-trading case in Taiwan has repeatedly cited the American legal theory of insider trading regulation. In this regard, Chapter 2 considers it necessary to learn from the development of American legal theory regarding insider trading and the important issues disputed therein. We can see that there are problems arise from indefinite concept of law and the applicability of legal theory in the judicial practice in Taiwan. Therefore, Chapter 3 takes the Jing-Yong insider-trading case to demonstrate that in the conduct of an insider trading scheme, the legal intervention of the criminal procedure not only failed to deter the insider trading but, on the contrary, was abused by the wrongdoer of the crime. This clearly shows that the use of the criminal procedure as the main deterrence of insider trading conflicts with the fact that the security law is, in essence, a market law. Thus, we should consider administrative measures as the main regulation of insider trading. Chapter 4 analyzes some measures the administrative branch should take in order to prevent insider trading, discussing issues in different aspects such as the development of a security market, the head account regulation, and the information disclosure system, etc. Consider that the insider trading is itself an investment behavior and one of the administrative goals of the Financial Supervisory Commission, the security supervisory organization, is to attract investment and expand the trading volume in the security market, we should see insider trading as an illegal conduct in order to protect other investors’ profit. This thesis argues for the idea that we should regulate the insider trading with administrative measures rather than with the criminal law. The key concept here is to raise the cost of the insider trading and hence make the inside-trader back out the deal. The security market itself should build up the mechanisms preventing the insider-trading. The first measure is the ethics, that is, the self- regulation of the dealer and that of the investors. The second measure goes to the administrative regulation. And the last measure is the judicial investigation and trial. Therefore, the Financial Supervisory Commission should establish a sound and complete administrative system in the first place to prevent insider trading, minimizing the impact caused by the insider-trading behavior in the market. We should first eliminate in the market the “the unbeneficial insider-trading” and “the insider-trading with little impact to the stock price”, and then send to judicial trial those inside traders that severely affect the security market and the investors, making them convicted and then punished. By these means, the function and value of the article 157 of the Security law could be fully carried out.