內線交易犯罪特性之研究

Analysis of Characteristics on Insider Trading Crime

賴逸靜(Yi-Jing Lai)

指導教授 ： 許春金

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/犯罪學研究所/碩士(2009年)

摘要

為防治內線交易，立法者除自77年於證交法中制訂內線交易之刑事法規範，予以入罪化外，其後證交法歷經多次修法，雖漸朝自由刑、重刑化之罰金刑，以及多元化之制裁方式等方向發展，但自95年最新證交法施行後，仍有層出不窮的內線交易弊案觀之，重刑化之立法規範是否足以嚇阻內線交易之犯罪行為，實有深入研究之必要。

本研究之目的，係為探討內線交易之特性，並分析證交法修法前後定罪與否之特徵及量刑之差異，期以瞭解重刑政策下內線交易案件能否達成嚇阻犯罪之立法目的，及我國法令規範及實務判決針對內線交易行為之管制成效。因此，研究方法擬採非干擾性研究之內容分析法，藉由蒐集89年5月起至98年6月止，地方法院對於違反證交法第157條之1之刑事類裁判書共81件，將每一件刑事類裁判書作為一個分析樣本，再根據每一樣本內之相關變項資料進行分類編碼與登錄，使樣本呈現之原始資料轉換成標準資料，再將標準資料進行量化統計分析，最後根據分析結果評估重刑政策能否達成嚇阻內線交易犯罪之立法目的，及我國法令規範及實務判決針對內線交易行為之管制成效，並分析歸納重刑化未能嚇阻內線交易之可能原因。

重刑化修法將內線交易之刑事責任提高至3年以上10年以下之目的，是期以嚇阻人民為內線交易犯罪行為，然本研究經實證分析後發現，地方法院一審刑事裁判為有罪之被告有71人（38％），平均刑期是17.91個月；裁判為無罪之被告有110人（59％）；另有5人（3%）法院諭知免訴或不受理。此外，內線交易案件被告一旦被起訴，地方法院一審刑事裁判有罪之比率不到4成。被告因坦承犯行而獲緩刑宣告之比例達100％；不坦承犯行亦獲緩刑宣告之比例為38.71％。在定罪率低、平均刑期17.91個月，且緩刑機率高之情形下，實難對於內線交易產生嚇阻作用，此亦印證重刑化修法後，內線交易案件仍層出不窮之現況。

準此，本研究認為應先破除嚴刑峻法的迷思，畢竟有嚴格之法律規範而無法為有效且合理之處罰，將使法律條文形同具文。此外，根據研究發現，另就重刑化未能嚇阻內線交易之可能原因，提出具體建議，希冀對於防治內線交易有所助益。

關鍵字

內線交易 ； 證交法第157條之1 ； 資訊平等理論 ； 忠實義務理論 ； 私取理論 ； 人頭帳戶

並列摘要

To prevent insider trading, legislators revised the Securities and Exchange Act in 1988 to make insider trading a criminal offense. While the Securities and Exchange Act went through further revisions to include free sentencing, heavy fines and a variety of severe punishment measures, there have continued to be cases of insider trading since the latest Securities and Exchange Act was implemented in 2006. Whether legislating for more severe punishment measures offers an effective deterrent to insider trading is therefore well worth studying in depth.

The purpose of this study is to explore the characteristics of insider trading as well as analyze the difference in guilty verdicts and sentences before and after revisions to the Securities and Exchange Act. The study hopes to determine whether a severe punishment policy for insider trading realizes the legislative goal of deterring the crime as well as the effectiveness of Taiwanese legislation and actual judgments in curbing insider trading. For this purpose, the study adopted the content analysis method used in unobtrusive research. First, each of the 81 criminal judgments handed down by the district courts for breaching Article 157-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act between May 2000 and June 2009 were treated as a distinct sample. The relevant variables in each judgment was then categorized then recorded to convert the raw data into a normalized format. The normalized data was then subjected to quantitative analysis using the SPSS (Statistics Package for the Social Sciences) statistical software. Finally, the results of the analysis were used to assess whether a severe punishment policy realized the legislative goal of deterring insider trading, the effectiveness of Taiwanese legislation and actual judgments in curbing insider trading, and collate the potential reasons why a more severe punishment policy has failed to deter insider trading.

More severe punishment laws increased the criminal sentence for insider trading to between 3 years and 10 years with the expectation of deterring the population from engaging in criminal insider trading. This study however found that for the first instance, the district courts handed down a guilty verdict for 71 accused (38%) with an average sentence of 17.91 months; a verdict of not guilty was handed down for 110 accused (59%); in 5 cases (3%) the courts dismissed or refused to hear the case. Even if insider trading cases do go to court, less than 40% of the accused are given a guilty verdict by the district courts for the first instance. The proportion of accused who received a suspended sentence for pleading guilty was 100%. Those who did not plead guilty but received a suspended sentence amounted to 38.71%. The low rate of successful prosecution, average sentences of just 17.91 months and a high chance of receiving a suspended sentence all offer little deterrence to insider trading. This can be shown in the way the insider trading has continued unabated despite the law being revised to include more serious punishments.

Based on these results, the study concludes that the belief in strong penalties and strict laws is misplaced. If strict laws don't result in effective and reasonable punishment, the letter of the law is just empty words. The study also identified possible reasons why more serious punishments have failed to deter insider trading and attempts to offer concrete recommendations on how insider trading can be prevented.

並列關鍵字

Insider Trading ； Article 157-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act ； The Equal Access Theory ； The Fiduciary Duty Theory ； The Misappropriation Theory ； Dummy Account

參考文獻

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