公司治理與現金持有關聯之研究－台灣上市公司之實證

Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings－The Empirical Evidence of Taiwanese Listed Companies

雲國華(Kuo-Hua Yun)

指導教授 ： 俞海琴

中原大學/商學院/國際貿易研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200700129

摘要

本文主要探討國內上市公司現金持有與公司治理之變數之關係。研究發現在總樣本中，經理人持股比率與現金持有比率存在顯著先負後正之非單調關係之誘因聯盟效果(Incentive alignment effect)及剝奪效果(Entrenchment effect )，其中經理人持股比率約在4.93%以下為誘因聯盟效果，公司之現金會做有效率運用，4.93%以上則產生剝奪效果，存在經理人道德危險。電子業中，亦存在顯著先負後正之誘因聯盟效果及剝奪效果，其中經理人持股比率約在6.04%以下為誘因聯盟效果，6.04%以上則產生剝奪效果。另電子業之控制股東持有之股份控制權與現金持有呈現負相關，而傳統產業為正相關；顯見電子業之控制股東仍考量到公司的盈虧與其直接休戚與共之關係。傳統產業或電子業之法人機構持股比率，與現金持有呈現正相關，表示無法發揮監督經理人之經營績效。而董事長兼總經理時，無論是電子業或傳統產業，均與現金持有存在顯著之正相關，就內部控管而言，無法達到監控的目的，致使企業持有較高之現金，相對影響公司績效表現。故顯見國內在公司治理方面仍應加強改善，才得以保護投資大眾，促進資本市場之活絡。

關鍵字

誘因聯盟效果 ； 公司治理 ； 剝奪效果 ； 現金持有

並列摘要

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings in Taiwanese Listed Companies. The empirical results show that evidence of a significant non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and cash holdings in all samples. We find that cash holdings first fall as managerial ownership up to 4.93% (i.e. the incentive alignment effect), it would reduce firms’ incentive to accumulate cash. Then rise at higher levels of managerial ownership (i.e. the entrenchment effect), manager would choose to hold more cash to pursue their own interests and higher the managerial moral hazard problems. In high-tech industry, cash holdings first a negative (incentive alignment effect) as managerial ownership up to 6.04%, then a positive (entrenchment effect) exerted by managerial ownership on cash holdings.
In high-tech industry, the empirical result was a negative impact between controlling shareholders of the voting rights and cash holdings; but in traditional industry, it was a positive impact. This result reveal that controlling shareholders of high-tech companies is to effectively monitor managers to ensure that they act in the interests of shareholders and to alleviate the agency problem. In institutional investors and cash holdings, no matter what high-tech or traditional industry, it is always a positive impact. At the same time, whether or not CEO and COB are the same person, the variable estimated coefficient is positive and significant. In internal control mechanisms, it was the lack of efficient monitoring and make firms hold higher cash balances.
In summary, insufficient external market discipline and the lack of efficient monitoring in Taiwan Stock Exchange, and should reinforce corporate governance to reduce the managerial moral hazard problems.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Governance ； Incentive Alignment Effect ； Cash Holdings ； Entrenchment Effect

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