從公司治理指標之集團監理探討力霸集團的瓦解

An Investigation of Corporation Governance for Consortium with Corporation Governance Indicator--the case of Rebar Group

蔡慧玲(Hui-Ling Tsai)

指導教授 ： 鄭淩淇

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201000081

摘要

摘 要
台灣大部分的上市櫃公司，其股權結構大多集中於家族手中，亦即他們擁有決定性的股權比率，足以主導整個董事會，並且參與公司的經營，因此稱為控制股東，而台灣大部分的公司都是由一個或多個家族共同創業而成，一般都是公司持有股數最多的群體，這個共同持有較多股權的控制股東，除了是股東的身份外，多也參與公司的經營，雖然有非常多的控制股東會努力經營公司，使公司價值持續成長，但是發生控制股東為己私利，而掏空公司資產傷害股東權益的事件也時有所聞。
高階管理者為了要讓交易量擴大，於是進行了一系列美化財務報表與盈餘操縱的交易與記錄，因此有必要從財務報表以外的資訊，來重新解釋財務危機發生的可能性，本研究以個案研究法，用公司治理評等及資金他人與背書保證、長期投資比率等，分析力霸集團的治理危機和力霸集團的瓦解來探討集團監理之關聯性，力霸集團如何運用各子公司的金字塔持股、投票權偏離現金流量權，及集團內母子公司的『資金貸與他人與背書保證』、『取得及處分資產』等手法進行掏空集團，進一步探討力霸集團內各上市櫃及公開發行之子公司治理不佳所透露的警訊，及內部控制、內外部稽核失敗造成個案公司的掏空，期以本個案之探討，能突顯集團監理的重要性，並且利用公司治理評等、內部控制及內外部稽核之力量，來阻止像力霸集團因為公司治理不佳而將集團內資產逐一掏空造成旗下整個集團的瓦解事件再次發生。

關鍵字

集團監理 ； 力霸集團 ； 公司治理指標

並列摘要

Abstract
The controlling stakes of most listed companies in Taiwanese are held by families, which mean the ratios of shares held by those families entitle them to the control over the boards of directors and the operation of those companies. Consequently, they are called controlling shareholders. Most of the corporations in Taiwan were founded by one or several families, who tend to hold most of the company shares. In addition to the status of shareholders, those controlling shareholders also take part in company's operation. Although many controlling shareholders endeavor in the operation and growth of the companies, it is common to see that those families try to benefit themselves by embezzling public funds from the companies, hollowing out company assets and infringe on the rights of general shareholders.
In order to expand trade volume, some high-ranking corporate executives even beautify companies' financial reports and revenues, and falsify trade records. Therefore, it is necessary for investors to correctly interpret the financial status of listed firms through information other than their financial reports to judge the possibility of any financial crises. Case study methodology was adopted in this research. An analysis was conducted on the governance crisis and the fall of Rebar Group through corporate governance rating system, the funding and acting as debt guarantor for others, and long-term investment ratio to further explore its correlations with group's governance and supervision. This study also explored how Rebar Group was hollowed out through the tactics of the pyramid-like shareholding among its subsidiaries, voting rights that deviated from cash flow rights, and its loans to others and concurrently acting as their debt guarantor, the obtainment and disposal of assets of the parent company and its subsidiaries. Discussions were conducted on the warning signals sent out by the poor governance of the public traded companies within Rebar Group and the hollowing out of the group because of the failure of the group's internal control and its internal and external audition. It is hoped that through this case study, the importance of the governance and monitoring of a business group can be highlighted and the same situation as Rebar Group's collapse can be prevented through a corporate governance rating system and the power of internal and external audition.

並列關鍵字

An Investigation of Corporation Governance ； Consortium with Corporation Governance Indicator ； the case of Rebar Group

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