技術移轉模式分析與實驗-以專利交易為例

Technology Transfer Model Analysis and Experiment-A Case of Patent Transaction

曾嘉良(Chia-Liang Tseng)

指導教授 ： 邱榆淨

中原大學/商學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201200787

摘要

摘要
技術移轉，是臺灣高科技產業發展縮影及典範，而專利授權為技術移轉中最具彈性、且易分割、風險最小方式之一，在「知識經濟」的時代，專利可以是一間公司、組織或團體最重要的無形資產，專利的數量及質量更是與企業發展有著密不可分的關係，擁有關鍵專利與否將影響公司未來的競爭優勢。
本研究以專利授權中最簡易的專利交易為主，結合行為經濟實驗之理論基礎最後通牒賽局(Ultimatum Game)，探討專利交易的模擬過程中分別對其實驗設計目的(1)實驗1買方及賣方皆具有市場的不確定性與資訊不對稱；(2)實驗2消除買方市場的資訊不對稱；（3）實驗3消除買賣雙方市場不確定性、不對稱性讓資訊對稱
實驗1分成第三方鑑價高價(140)及低價(100) ;買方每期都有第三方鑑價的資訊，賣方則是電腦隨機提供，觀察及檢定第三方鑑價高價、低價對買方出價有無顯著差異。實驗2，同實驗1加上隨機提供「注意賣方也知此鑑價結果」，觀察此資訊對買方出價之影響。實驗3第三方鑑價全為120，買方每回合都出現第三方鑑價及「注意買方也知此鑑價結果」，賣方每回合都有專利第三方鑑價，觀察其交易情形。
本實驗研究結果顯示(1)實驗1中第三方鑑價高價及低價確實會影響買方出價。於(2)實驗2中(i)買方資訊有無顯示「注意賣方也知此鑑價資訊」不影響買方出價 (ii)當買方不論是否知道「賣方也知此鑑價資訊」，第三方鑑價高價對於買方出價與第三方鑑價低價對於買方出價階有顯著影響(iii)當皆為第三方鑑價高價或第三方鑑價低價時，此二群，一群為賣方知此鑑價資訊，另一群為不知道，這二群沒顯著差異。(3)實驗3中買方、賣方獲利比46.24%:53.76%，與最後通牒賽局(Ultimatum Game)常見的50%比50%分配比率類似，但獲利來說是賣方較高。

關鍵字

技術移轉 ； 最後通牒賽局 ； 行為經濟實驗 ； 專利交易

並列摘要

Abstract
Technology transfer is the microcosm and the model of Taiwan’s high-tech industrial development. Patent licensing is the most flexible, easy to split, and risk minimization in technology transfer. In the era of knowledge economy, the patent is the most important intangible asset for a company, an organization or a group. The quality and the quantity of patent have the close relationship with the business development. In other words, the company with the key patent has much more competitive advantage.
This study focuses on the patent transaction which is the easiest in the patent licensing. At the same time, this study combines the Behavioral and Economics Experiments and the ultimatum game to explore the imitative process of patent transaction. In the process, the purposes of experiments in the study are: (1) to prove that both the buyer market and the seller market have the uncertainty and the information asymmetry in experiment 1; (2) to eliminate the information asymmetry of the buyer market in experiment 2; (3) to eliminate the uncertainty and the information asymmetry of the buyer market and the seller market in experiment 3.
Experiment 1 is to test the influence of high- and low-priced valuation offered by the third party to buyer’s bid. In experiment 1, there are two groups, high-priced valuation (140) and low-priced valuation (100). For every round, buyers can get the valuation information from the third party, but sellers get it from computer randomly; which means buyers must have the valuation information every round, but sellers are not sure to get it. Experiment 2 is the same as experiment 1, and adds another condition that is seller also know the valuation result and to test buyer’s bid. In experiment 3, this study gives two conditions to buyer, one is the third-party valuation information (120), and the other is seller also know the valuation result; on the other hand, this study just gives one condition, the third-party valuation information (120), to seller and to test the result.
The results reveal that: (1) In experiment 1, high- and low-priced valuation have the influence on buyer’s bid significantly; (2) In Experiment 2, (i) show the condition, seller also know the valuation information, or not, it does not influence buyer’s bid, (ii) show the condition, seller also know the valuation information, or not, there are significant differences between the high-priced valuation of the third party and the low-priced valuation of the third party; (iii) when both in the high- or low-priced valuation of the third party, the two groups (one is to know the condition, seller also know the valuation information, and the other is not) do not have significant differences; (3) In experiment 3, the profit ratio of buyer and seller is 46 : 54, and the result is similar to 50 : 50 ultimatum game mentioned. But for the profit, seller is greater than buyer.

並列關鍵字

Technology Transfer ； Patent Transaction ； Behavioral and Economics Experiments ； Ultimatum Game

參考文獻

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