由於企業資訊透明度的提昇可以增加企業價值、降低企業籌資成本,並對受評公司產生正面的影響、使得投資人做出更準確、即時的判斷。而代理問題是影響自願性揭露的主因,因此,本研究欲以代理問題的角度去探討與資訊揭露之關聯性。 結果發現,不論是哪一種代理問題,都傾向於當代理問題愈嚴重,資訊揭露評鑑等級會愈高。代表當代理問題愈嚴重時,此時主理人會加強監督代理人要求揭露更多的資訊以降低代理問題的程度。而存在多重的代理問題對於資訊揭露評鑑的等級不會有影響。但若以變動值之方式檢驗則當代理問題發生變動,當評鑑系統細分更清楚時,代理問題發生變動則不會影響資訊揭露評鑑等級的更動。
The information transparency can increase corporate value and lower corporate financing costs, it causes positive impact for the evaluated company and let investors make the accurate decisions and timely judgments. The agency problem is the main reason of affecting the voluntary disclosure. This study trying to investigate the relationship between the agency problems and the information disclosure. The empirical results show that it will be the higher level of information disclosure when the agency problems tend to more seriously. The administrator will strengthen the supervision of agents required disclose more information when agency problems become seriously that can reduce the extent of agency problems. However, there is no significant relationship between multiple agency problems and the level of information disclosure evaluation. If we examine the changes in value of the method for the change of the agency problems, the change of the agent problems will not affect the evaluation of information disclosure when broken down clearer evaluation system.