鑒於世界各國陸續發生財報弊案,導致投資人對於財務報導喪失了信心,進而促使各國相繼立法強化公司管理階層與會計師查核財務報表之責任,而投資大眾也開始高度關注公司治理與財務報表之品質。本文分別以超額非審計公費、非審計公費除以總公費及超額總審計公費,作為會計師獨立性衡量代理變數。實證上分別以不同會計處理保守衡量模型,來探討會計師獨立性與公司財務報導保守程度之關聯,並以董事會特徵結構的角度,進一步分析董事會特性對會計師獨立性之影響。 本研究以2002年至2006年作為研究期間,以有揭露審計服務公費及非審計服務公費之上市上櫃公司為研究樣本,實證結果發現會計師獨立性及董事會效率性與簽證客戶之會計保守主義呈正相關;會計師獨立性對於董事會較有效率之公司會計保守性的正向影響,亦大於其對董事會運作較無效率公司之會計處理保守的正向影響。
In view of the successive and worldwide occurrence of financial statement fraud, which makes investors lose confidence in financial reports, countries are sequentially urged to make law for strengthening the responsibility of management level and financial statements auditor. The public investors also begin to pay high attention on the corporate governance of companies and the quality of financial statements. This paper respectively adopts excess non-audit fees, non-audit fees divided by total fees and excess total audit fees to serve as proxy variables for the measurement of auditor independence. Different models for the measurement of accounting conservatism are empirically adopted to explore the relationship between auditor independence and the conservatism degree of financial reports. Besides, in the viewpoint of the board structure features, the influence of board features on auditor independence is further analyzed. The research period of this study is from 2002 to 2006, during which listed companies with data of audit fees and non-audit fees disclosed are selected as research samples. As the result shows, the auditor independence and board effectiveness are positively correlated with the accounting conservatism towards clients’ accounting methods; the positive influence of auditor independence on accounting conservatism towards a company with an efficient board is also greater than that with an inefficient one.