過去國內外公司治理文獻中,忙碌董事對於公司究竟會帶來聲譽效果(reputational effect)還是忙碌效果(business effect),學者們對此看法不一,不過國內公開發行公司獨立董事設置及應遵循事項辦法中規定,獨立董事兼任其他公開發行公司獨立董事不得超過三家。本研究以2002年至2015年國內公開發行公司為研究對象,探討董事會中獨立董監事的忙碌程度對於經理人從事盈餘管理行為之影響,並進一步探討公司其他獨立董監事是否能夠減緩此現象。實證結果發現,當獨立董監事兼任之公司家數越多,經理人越容易從事向下盈餘管理以達到洗大澡目的,但向上盈餘管理行為不會受到影響;而且即使公司聘請再多的獨立董監事,也無法善盡財務報表監督之責,反而使經理人有更多機會操縱盈餘。整體來說,本研究結果大致符合忙碌效果的論點。
Literature on corporate governance has indicated that busy directors may have both positive and negative effects on firm practices. However, the “Regulations Governing Appointment of Independent Directors and Compliance Matters for Public Companies” in Taiwan stipulates that a public firm’s independent director is prohibited from acting as more than three other public companies’ independent board member. Using Taiwanese public companies during 2002 to 2015, this paper studies the impact of interlock of independent directors on earnings management. Empirical results show that there is a positive association between the number of director interlock and downward earnings management. However, director’s interlock does not affect upward earnings management.