過去文獻大多以單一理論探討公司治理之相關議題,本研究為彌補過去文獻之不足,應用代理理論與訊號發射理論發展研究假說,並利用聯立方程式檢測獨立董事、關係人交易與公司價值三者間之因果關係。本研究以2001至2003年期間自願設立獨立董事之已上市櫃公司共145家為樣本公司,並從樣本期間未設立獨立董事之公司篩選145家為配對樣本進行實證分析。 實證結果有以下幾點發現:(1)關係人交易的比率愈高,將降低公司價值;(2)關係人交易愈多的公司,愈趨於不設立獨立董事;(3)獨立董事比例愈高,愈能有效抑制關係人交易;(4)公司價值的高低,並不會影響公司是否從事關係人交易;(5)公司是否自願設立獨立董事與公司價值並無顯著關聯性存在。
The theories used to explain the corporate governance problem make use of agency theory and signaling theory, but prior research has only explored one of these theories and the empirical results have not been consistent. This paper uses the simultaneous equation model to investigate the cause-effect relationship among independent directors, related party transactions and firm value. The data consists of 145 companies from those firms listed on TSE and OTC in Taiwan which voluntarily engaged independent directors from 2001 to 2003, and, as a control sample, an additional group of 145 companies which did not set up independent directors. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, the proportion of the related party transactions has a negative effect on the firm value. Second, the higher the proportion of the related party transactions, the lower the proportion of independent directors to all directors. Third, the set-up of the independent directors can significantly reduce the related party transactions. Fourth, the firm value does not have a significant effect on the amount of the related party transactions. Fifth, the companies voluntarily establishing independent directors do not have a significant relation with the firm value.