本研究以2012年至2016年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,探討經理人自信、會計穩健性與盈餘管理之關聯性。本研究以Campbell et al.(2011)及Ahmed and Duellman(2013)等人的方式來衡量過度自信,取所有樣本中屬淨買入其公司股票的前20% 之經理人且經理人當年度持股淨增加超過10% 者,視為過度自信;以 Khan and Watts (2009) 的c-score模型來衡量公司的穩健性,選用Kothari, Leone, and Wasely( 2005)模型計算裁決性應計數衡量盈餘管理之程度。實證結果顯示,當經理人具有過度自信特質時,其公司的裁決性應計數絕對值越高,二者呈不顯著的正相關。同時,本研究還檢測會計穩健性對於經理人盈餘管理行為的影響,結果指出,當企業會計穩健性越高時,經理人盈餘管理的程度越低。最後本研究檢驗經理人過度自信與會計穩健性的交互項對於經理人盈餘管理行為之影響,實證顯示,在同時考量兩者的影響下,過度自信變數主導了此交乘項的結果,呈現過度自信經理人傾向盈餘管理的局面。
This study investigates the association of CEO’s overconfidence, accounting conservatism and earnings management by using the listed companies and OTC companies from 2012 to 2016 as sample. In this study, Overconfidence is by defining net purchases of company shares by managers during the current year as the top 20% of the sample which stakes grow by over 10% during the year at same time. Besides, we respectively use C-score by Khan & Watts (2009) to measure accounting conservatism and employ discretionary accruals by Kothari, Leone, & Wasely (2005) to measure earnings management. The empirical results show that if the CEO is characteristic of overconfidence, the discretionary accruals of this firm will be higher, and they are insignificant positive. Meanwhile, we also examine the effect of conservatism on managers’ earnings management, and it suggest when the level of conservatism is higher, the level of earnings management will be lower. Finally, we examine the joint effect of overconfidence and conservatism on managers’ earnings management. The empirical results demonstrate that the impact of overconfidence seems to overwhelm the interaction of the both while taking the two into account; and it shows the managers tend to undertaking earnings management.