永續供應鏈結合企業社會責任與銷售回扣之最佳訂價策略

Optimal pricing strategy for sustainable supply chain with corporate social responsibility and sales rebates

陳柏融(Bo-Rong Chen)

指導教授 ： 黃惠民

中原大學/電機資訊學院/工業與系統工程研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201600394

摘要

近年來，因為供應鏈的活動影響了環境與社會，因此企業也想為環境與社會盡一份心力，包括社會倫理、環境永續和綠色環保等相關議題都是企業想努力的範疇，國際企業考慮企業社會責任（Corporate Social Responsible, CSR）已成為一種趨勢。
過去的供應鏈中，供應鏈各成員皆以自身利潤最大化為目標，卻未考量對方的利益與想法，導致雙方的營運皆面臨困難，故企業與企業之間的合作更顯得重要，藉由各種企業結盟與策略性合約，使雙方關係更加密切以達到整體供應鏈之利潤有效提升。
本研究針對單一產品，探討單一製造商與單一零售商分別考慮企業社會責任（Corporate Social Responsible, CSR），透過銷售回扣之協商機制，以提升整體利潤最大化為目標。另外，於模型中亦加入需求與價格互相依存之因素，使零售商可利用價格影響產品的需求數量，增加消費者購買意願。本研究使用Stackelberg game賽局手法來解決模式問題，利用Maple 14進行運算，求得製造商與零售商間之最佳訂購量、最佳零售價格與最佳批發價格，後續透過數值範例及敏感度分析來證明本研究所提出模型之可行性與合理性，並說明各項參數對於模型之影響程度。

關鍵字

企業社會責任(CSR) ； Stackelberg game ； 銷售回扣 ； 價格相依

並列摘要

In recent years, there is an increasing impact of supply chain activities towards environment and society. The introduction of social ethics and environment protection can contribute to environment sustainability and social well being. These efforts are considered as corporate social responsibilities (CSR) and has become an important requirement for companies.
Traditionally, every player in supply chain system tries to maximize profit without considering the interests of the other players. This results in sub/local optimality of every player in the supply chain system. Hence, cooperation among the players should be encouraged to achieve global optimal solution. Through various corporate and strategic alliance agreements, every player in supply chain system could work collaboratively in order to increase their overall profits.
The supply chain system in this study is assumed to consist of a single product, a single manufacturer and a single retailer. We also consider CSR and sales rebates contract, with the goal of maximizing the overall profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer. In addition, our proposed model considers the correlation between demand and price. The pricing and sales rebate policy influences the manufacturer and the retailer. In this study, Stackelberg game is used to model and solve the problem using Maple 14. The aims of this study are to: (i) determine the optimal order quantity between the manufacturer and the retailer, (ii) determine the best wholesale prices and retail prices under different policies, (iii) demonstrate the feasibility and rationality of the model through sensitivity analysis and (iv) explain the impacts of each parameter in the model.

並列關鍵字

Corporate social responsibility ； Stackelberg game ； Sales rebates contract ； Price dependent

參考文獻

31. 林佑融，(2010)，"不同通路策略之最佳營收分享及退貨政策"，中原大學工業與系統工程研究所學位論文。

38. 陳靜慧，(2011)，"價格相依之通路營收分享機制—以電子書內容銷售為例"，國立交通大學經營管理研究學位論文。

41. 賴俊諺，(2009)，"供應鏈結合利潤分享與銷售下之最佳訂購策略"，中原大學工業與系統工程研究所學位論文。

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