財務危機公司高階經理人薪酬之研究—公司治理面之探討

A Study on CEO Compensation for Financial Distress Firms: A Perspective of Corporate Governance

鄭嘉蓮(Chia-Lien Cheng)

指導教授 ： 胡為善 ； 鄒翊

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2006年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200600368

摘要

企業所有權與經營權分離產生代理問題，代理問題的存在必須提供適當的激勵或監督機制來防止高階經理人追求個人自身利益的行為；高階經理人薪酬契約的設計，可用以降低代理問題，使高階經理人與股東之利益更為一致。近年來，我國陸續爆發上市公司挪用資產或造假帳的案件，這些財務危機公司較可能藉由盈餘管理手段來操縱盈餘，俾提昇個人薪酬水準。
　　本研究旨在以公司治理角度，探討財務危機公司高階經理人之薪酬政策；研究目的有三：（1）探討財務危機公司相較於正常公司，高階經理人的薪酬是否較高；（2）探討財務危機公司之公司治理機制是否對高階經理人薪酬產生影響；（3）探討財務危機公司相較於正常公司，公司治理變數對高階經理人薪酬之敏感性是否具增額效果。
　　以1999年至2005年間發生財務危機之上市櫃公司為研究對象，以危機發生年度前三年為研究期間，並採用相同產業及規模相近之配對方式選取配對正常公司。
　　本研究之實證結果顯示如下：
一、財務危機公司之高階經理人薪酬水準，雖較正常公司高，但未達顯著性。
二、董事長兼任總經理、董事會規模和機構投資人持股比例與財務危機公司之高階經理人薪酬具顯著關係。
三、財務危機虛擬變數和董事長兼任總經理之交互項顯著為正，財務危機虛擬變數和高階經理人持股比例之交互項顯著為負，指出財務危機公司之董事長兼任總經理和高階經理人持股比例對高階經理人薪酬之敏感性具增額效果。

關鍵字

股權結構 ； 公司治理 ； 高階經理人薪酬 ； 董事會組成

並列摘要

Since Jensen and Meckling（1976）proposed the terminology of agency theory, the academics and practioners realized that the agency problem exists in corporations because ownership is separated from management. Consequently, a company must provide monitoring mechanisms or encouragement strategies to prevent the high-level management from emphasizing their own benefits rather than maximizing stockholders’ wealth. The compensation contract for high-level management can reduce the agency problem, and cause the interest of the high-level management consistent with those of stockholders. Recently, there have been many financial scandals occurred in Taiwan owing to the managers seized the assets of the company. For those financially distressed firms, some of the high-level management manipulated corporate earnings to raise their compensations.
　　This study attempts to examine the compensation policy for high-level management of the financially distressed firms from the perspectives of corporate governance. The main purpose has classified into three sub-objectives. First, to explore whether the compensations of high-level management for financially distressed firms are higher than those for non-distressed firms. Second, to examine whether corporate governance has an impact on the compensations of high-level management. Finally, to investigate the sensitivity of corporate governance parameters to the compensations of high-level management and examine whether there is a significant difference between the financially distressed firms and non-distressed firms.
　　This work selects 104 firms in Taiwan which experienced seriously financial distress during the period of 1999 to 2005 and included the three-year period prior to the company experienced financial distress. For comparing purposes, this investigation chooses another 104 non-distressed firms in the same industry which have the similar size as the distressed firms as the matching samples.
　　The empirical results are as follows:
1.The compensations for high-level management of the financially distressed firms are insignificantly higher that those for the non-distressed firms.
2.The findings indicate that the three parameters such as the chairman of the board also pluralized as the CEO of the company, the number of the board members and the percentage of the institutional investors to total investors all have significant relationships with the compensations of high-level management for the financially distressed firms.
3.The interaction of the financially distressed factors has a significantly positive relationship with the chairman of the board also pluralized as CEO. However, the interaction of the financially distressed factors have significantly negative relationship with the percentage of the number of common stocks owned by CEOs to total investors. The findings also suggest that the sensitivity of the chairman of the board also pluralized as the CEO of the company and the percentage of CEOs to the compensations for CEOs of the financially distressed firms have incremental effects.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance ； the compensation for CEO ； Ownership structure ； Board of Directors

參考文獻

傅鍾仁、歐進士、張寶光（2000），「我國企業經理人薪酬與其經營績效之實證」，台灣經濟學會2000年年會論文。

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