公司治理評鑑與關係人交易之關聯性

自從1997年亞洲金融危機的爆發衝擊了各國經濟並造成社會動盪後，各國開始重視公司治理，並紛紛致力於加強公司治理機制，提升公司治理的品質。其後爆發的一連串弊案（如安隆（Enron）醜聞案、力霸掏空案、康友掏空案等）亦為我國敲響了警鐘，促使我國於2014年起推動實施每年一度的公司治理評鑑，其評鑑指標架構涵蓋多個層面，並配以不同權重，以期能公正客觀衡量台灣上市（櫃）企業的公司治理成效。細究前述諸多弊案，皆可從中見到關係人交易的影子，這影響了投資大眾信心的同時，關係人交易的優劣也備受質疑，因此許多研究開始探討如何透過公司治理來影響關係人交易，Yeh et al.（2012）的研究結果明確指出，良好的公司治理可有效限制關係人交易，減少管理當局的機會主義行為。然而先前的文獻多以單一構面來衡量公司治理，相較於整合性的公司治理評等指標，較難呈現公司治理之全貌，高蘭芬等人（2012）亦指出個別的公司治理構面變數僅能展現部分而不能完整的衡量公司治理。故本研究以2016年至2019年上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，採用Tobit模型，以金融監督管理委員會所提供之第三屆至第六屆公司治理評鑑結果，作為公司治理的代理變數來進行迴歸測試，檢驗公司治理評鑑對關係人交易之影響，期望以更具專業及整合性之公司治理評等指標─公司治理評鑑，來呈現公司治理的全貌，探討整體的公司治理程度強弱與關係人交易的關聯性。研究結果顯示，公司治理評鑑等級與關係人銷貨交易比例呈顯著正相關，與應收關係人借支比例則呈顯著負相關；換言之，當公司治理評鑑等級愈高時，公司的關係人銷貨交易比例愈高，應收關係人借支比例則愈低。同時從實證結果可知，公司治理對於不同類型之關係人交易，具有不同的影響。

關鍵字

公司治理評鑑；關係人交易；公司治理

並列摘要

Since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 hit the economies of various countries and caused social unrest, countries began to attach importance to corporate governance, and have been working to strengthen corporate governance mechanisms to improve the quality of corporate governance. A series of scandals that broke out later (such as 2001 Anlong, 2007 China Rebar Co., Ltd, 2020 Pharmally, etc.) issued warnings to Taiwan, prompting Taiwan to promote the implementation of an annual corporate governance review in 2014. In order to fairly and objectively measure the effectiveness of corporate governance of listed companies in Taiwan, this evaluation index covers multiple levels and is assigned different weights. A closer look at the many aforementioned scandals reveals that they all involve transactions with related parties. This has affected the confidence of the investing public, and the pros and cons of transactions with related parties have also been questioned. Therefore, many studies have begun to explore how to influence related party transactions through corporate governance. The research results of Yeh et al. (2012) clearly pointed out that good corporate governance can effectively restrict related party transactions and reduce the opportunistic behavior of management authorities. However, the previous literature mostly used a single aspect to measure corporate governance. Compared with the integrated corporate governance rating indicators, it is more difficult to present the full picture of corporate governance. Lan-Feng Kao et al. (2012) also pointed out that individual corporate governance dimension variables can only show part of it and cannot fully measure corporate governance. Therefore, this study takes the listed companies from 2016 to 2019 as the research object, adopts the tobit model, and uses the third to sixth corporate governance evaluation results provided by the Financial Regulatory Commission as the proxy variable of corporate governance to conduct regression testing to test the impact of corporate governance evaluation on related party transactions. This research hopes to use a more professional and integrated corporate governance evaluation indicator—corporate governance evaluation to fully present corporate governance and explore the relationship between the overall degree of corporate governance and related party transactions. The results of the study show that the corporate governance evaluation is significantly positively correlated with the related-party sales transactions, and is significantly negatively correlated with the related-party receivable borrowings; In other words, when the corporate governance evaluation rating level is higher, the higher the proportion of related-party sales transactions and the lower the proportion of related-party receivable borrowings. At the same time, it can be seen from the empirical results that corporate governance has different effects on different types of related party transactions.