在雙渠道銷售下考量渠道協調、政府補貼與中斷管理探討不同綠色產品DIGP與MIGP之利潤模式

A study of the profit model of different green products DIGP and MIGP with consideration of channel coordination, government subsidy, and disruption management in dual channel sales

李育全(YU-CHUAN LI)

指導教授 ： 饒忻

中原大學/電機資訊學院/工業與系統工程學系/碩士(2022年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu202201174

摘要

伴隨著環保意識的興起，各國政府對環境問題也越加重視，希望能夠在經濟和環境之間取得平衡，因此有些國家開始提倡資源回收、再製造，訂定環保法規。除此之外，政府的補貼也是相當重要，可以激勵企業研發不同類型的綠色產品，而企業為了獲得更多的利潤，除了在傳統的零售渠道銷售產品，也開始在直銷渠道銷售產品增加利潤。
本研究運用Stackelberg博弈理論的研究方法，建立具有雙渠道的綠色供應鏈模型，其中一種模型是開發密集型綠色產品在供應鏈中銷售，而另一種模型是邊際成本密集型綠色產品在供應鏈中銷售，並考量政府有無補貼，其中也考慮消費者的渠道偏好、綠色產品綠色程度、製造商和零售商之間的關稅合同與中斷管理，進行分析和探討。研究結果發現，當政府有補貼時，綠色產品的價格會降低，產品的需求量會上升。消費者的渠道偏好以及製造商與零售商之間的合同也會對其產品銷售產生影響，因此製造商可以先做好市場分析，再來策畫營運方式，因此可增加獲利機會。另外當政府願意投資製造商去研究開發密集型綠色產品且超過一定的補貼金額時，可以讓製造商的利潤提高，同時環保效益也提高，形成雙贏的局面。相信本研究之成果可做為政府、製造商與零售商等相關人士進行運營規劃或執行的參考。

關鍵字

博弈論 ； 雙渠道供應鏈 ； 綠色產品 ； 政府補貼 ； 渠道協調 ； 中斷管理

並列摘要

With the rise of environmental awareness, governments around the world have paid more and more attention to environmental issues, hoping to achieve a balance between the economy and the environment. Therefore, some countries have begun to advocate resource recycling, remanufacturing, and formulate environmental regulations. In addition, government subsidies are also very important, which can motivate companies to develop different types of green products. In order to obtain more profits, in addition to selling products in traditional retail channels, companies also begin to sell products in direct sales channels to increase profits.
This study uses the research method of Stackelberg game theory to develop a green supply chain model with two channels, one of which is development-intensive green products sold in the supply chain, and the other model is marginal cost-intensive green products in the supply chain. Our sales take into account whether there are government subsidies, which also take into account consumers' channel preferences, the greenness of green products, tariff contracts, and interruption management between manufacturers and retailers. The results of the study found that when the government has subsidies, the price of green products will decrease and the demand for products will increase. Consumer channel preferences and contracts between manufacturers and retailers also have an impact on the sales of their products, so manufacturers can do a market analysis before planning how to operate, thus increasing profit opportunities. In addition, when the government is willing to invest in manufacturers to research and develop intensive green products and the subsidy amount exceeds a certain amount, it can increase the profits of the manufacturers and improve the environmental protection benefits, forming a win-win situation. It is believed that the results of this research can be used as a reference for governments, manufacturers, and retailers to conduct operational planning or implementation.

並列關鍵字

Game Theory ； Dual-channel Supply Chain ； Green Products ； Government Subsidy ； Channel Coordination ； Disruption Management

參考文獻

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