財務報表重編與公司治理評鑑及高階經理人與董監事獎酬
之關聯性

理性的投資人在做投資決策時，公司的財務報表是做決策最關鍵的判斷之一，但是，若公司的財務報表有報導不實之情事或甚至是涉嫌舞弊、作假帳、窗飾財務報表等不法之事，這就使得投資人及社會大眾對公司財務報表及會計師的信任度下降，而自從會計弊案爆發後，投資大眾、利益關係人及主管機關等紛紛重視公司治理等議題，而根據以前學者指出當公司發生會計弊案、舞弊等財務報表表達不實之情況時，公司財報發生重編之可能性也會越大，因此當公司財報重編時，意謂著公司之內部管理公司治理可能出現了一些問題。金融海嘯爆發後，股東權益遭受損害，但公司董監事及高階經理人卻仍坐領優厚酬勞，於是國內外紛紛出現公司給付董監事與高管的薪酬是否合理等相關問題。由於前人研究較少著墨在董監事薪酬部分，故本研究將薪酬組成部分另區分出高管股權報酬與董監事股權報酬以探討公司薪酬組成是否會影響公司美化財務報表。　　而近年來，國內在104年公布了第一屆的公司治理評鑑結果，其公司治理評鑑制度係透過綜合指標加權後，得出一個量化公司治理的等級，以供公司內部進行公司管理決策之調整及以利投資大眾作決策的依據之一，為一項評等企業公司治理良莠之制度，故本研究欲探討公司治理評鑑及薪酬相關等問題與財報重編之關聯。　　研究結果指出，公司治理評鑑與財報重編為顯著正相關，顯示出當公司治理評鑑較差時，其公司財務報表重編之可能性較大；另外在薪酬方面則發現，當公司治理評鑑較差時高管股權報酬佔薪酬比例與財報重編為顯著正相關，顯示出當公司治理評鑑較差，高管股權報酬佔薪酬比例越高時，出於自利行為，公司財務報表重編之情況較大；公司治理評鑑較差時高管獎金報酬佔薪酬比例與財報重編為顯著負相關，顯示考量公司治理評鑑與高管獎金報酬比例之交互影響時，對於財報重編之可能性有抑制效果；公司治理評鑑較差，董監事股權報酬佔薪酬比例與財報重編為顯著負相關，顯示出當公司治理評鑑較差，董監事股權報酬佔薪酬比例越低時，董監事越具獨立性，其監督公司效能較高，因此導致公司自願性財務報表重編之情況較大。

關鍵字

財務報表重編；公司治理評鑑；薪酬制度

並列摘要

When a rational investor makes an investment decision, the company's financial statements are one of the most critical judgments for making a decision. However, if the company's financial statements are reported to be untrue or even suspected of fraud, or window dressing, which is a matter of lawlessness, the trust of investors and the public to the company's financial statements and accountants will be reduced. Since the outbreak of accounting fraud, the investing public, stakeholders and authorities have focus on issues such as corporate governance. According to previous studies, when the company’s financial statements involve material misstatements due to fraud, the possibility of restatement of the company’s financial reporting will be greater. Therefore, corporate financial restatements means there may be some problems in internal control and corporate governance. After the outbreak of the financial tsunami, shareholders' rights and interests suffered damage. However, company’s directors and managements still took advantage of the rewards. Therefore, there have been related issues such as whether the company pays directors and management compensation properly. Since prior research studied less on directors’ compensation, this study will distinguish the management compensation component and the directors' shareholding compensation component from the company’s total compensation to explore whether the company's compensation composition will affect the company's intention of fraudulent financial reporting. In recent years, the first domestic corporate governance evaluation results were published in 2015. The corporate governance evaluation system is weighted by comprehensive indicators to obtain a quantitative level of corporate governance for company’s adjustment of management and the basis for making investment decisions for the public. Therefore, this study is intended to explore the relationship between corporate governance evaluation and compensation related issues and financial restatement. The results of the study indicate that corporate governance evaluation and financial restatement were significantly positively correlated, showing that when corporate governance evaluation is poor, the company's financial restatement is more likely; in addition, in terms of compensation, it is found that when corporate governance evaluation is poor, the proportion of shareholding compensation of the management is significantly positively correlated with the restatement of the financial report. It shows when the corporate governance evaluation is poor, the higher proportion of the equity compensation pays, the higher possibility that the company restates financial statements. When the corporate governance evaluation is poor, the management’s bonus proportion of compensation is significantly negatively correlated with the financial restatement, which shows the mitigating effect on financial restatement when considering the interaction of the corporate governance evaluation and the management’s bonus proportion of compensation. In addition, while the corporate governance evaluation is poor, the lower the proportion of equity compensation for directors, the more independence, resulting in a higher possibility of financial restatements.